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COMMON SENSE: TREATING STATUTORY NON-
OBVIOUSNESS AS A NOVELTY ISSUE
N. Scott Piercet
Abstract
Title 35 of the United States Code at § 103 limits patent
protection to subject matter that would not be "obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." The requirement was introduced
as a statute by the Patent Act of 1952, but, according to the legislative
history, was a codification of judicial precedent. The origin of that
precedent generally is attributed to the 1851 Supreme Court decision
of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. However, Hotchkiss was not widely
declared a watershed moment in legal history until Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. ninety years later, and enactment
of the Patent Act of 1952. The decision by the Supreme Court in
Hotchkiss was, in fact, consistent with earlier case law developed
largely by English courts, and by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story. Until KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme
Court, despite language that appears to link patentability to skill,
generally maintained an underlying requirement, predating
Hotchkiss, that patentable subject matter embody a new application
of principle that alters the functional relationship between claimed
components of statutory subject matter. Invocation of broad
motivation and "common sense" by the Court in KSR to determine
patentability ironically limits the capacity of reason to produce the
consistent results intended by the enactment of§ 103.
t Principal, Hamilton Brook Smith Reynolds, Concord, MA, and Adjunct Professor at
Suffolk University Law School. He can be reached at (978) 341-0036 and at
scott.pierce@HBSR.com. The author is solely responsible for the views of this article.
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An army of principles will penetrate where an army of soldiers
cannot-It will succeed where diplomatic management would fail-
It is neither the Rhine, the Channel, nor the Ocean, that can arrest
its progress-It will march on the horizon of the world, and it will
conquer.
Thomas Paine
INTRODUCTION
Title 35, § 102 of the United States Code provides a list of
conditions for novelty of statutorily competent subject matter, and
states that a "person shall be entitled to a patent unless" any of the
conditions in the several paragraphs of that section are met.2 Section
103 adds that,
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.3
P.J. Federico, in his 1954 Commentary on the 1952 Patent Act, stated
that, "this section is a limitation on section 102 and it should more
logically have been made part of section 102, but it was made a
separate section to prevent 102 from becoming too long and involved
and because of its importance."4 The legislative history of the Patent
Act of 1952 makes clear that § 103 was based on previous notions of
"patentable novelty," as stated in the Revision Notes, which Federico
quotes in his commentary:
The Revision Notes further state, under section 103:
"There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence
explicitly stated in the present statutes, but the refusal of patents by
the Patent Office, and the holding of patents invalid by the courts,
on the ground of lack of invention of [sic] lack of patentable
novelty has been followed since at least as early as 1850. This
paragraph is added with the view that an explicit statement in the
1. Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE
609, 622 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
4. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. (1954), reprinted in
75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 161, 180 (1993).
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statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a
basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be
worked out."
5
Therefore, at least in view of the legislative history of the Patent Act
of 1952, § 103 was intended to be a codification of "patentable
novelty," as applied under judicial precedent since "at least as early as
1850.,,6
In fact, the statutory basis on which courts developed "patentable
novelty" was laid down in the Patent Act of 1793 and was well-
developed before 1850 by the courts, primarily through the efforts of
Justice Story in decisions he rendered while riding circuit in the
District of Massachusetts. Justice Story, in turn, drew his reasoning
from case law established in England after 1790. Even under the
Patent Act of 1790, as later relayed by Thomas Jefferson, examination
of patent applications included informal rules that barred patentability
for mere changes in form or proportion from what was already in the
public domain.7
The notion that the modern conception of non-obviousness was
born from the Supreme Court's decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood
was expressed by the Supreme Court in Cuno Engineering Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp.,9 ninety years after Hotchkiss. Subsequent
focus upon Hotchkiss in the legislative history of the Patent Act of
1952 has further perpetuated this notion, and has caused confusion in
the application of judicial doctrine codified under § 103.
Closer inspection of minimum requirements of patentability,
when viewed in the context of prior art, reveals that Supreme Court
decisions have always presumed, as did the statutes under which they
operated, that some new application of principle, or "mode of
operation," and not mere changes in form or proportion, represented a
form of novelty. Although a new application of principle could take
many forms, generally speaking it was manifested in some new
operative relationship among the component parts, as opposed to, for
example, a novel combination of parts acting independently of each
other, also known as an "aggregation," which has never been
considered patentable.
5. Id. at 181 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 18 (1952); S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 18
(1952)).
6. Id.
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in GREGORY A.
STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS 899,903 (2d ed. 2000).
8. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
9. Cuno Eng'g Corp v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
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Since the Patent Act of 1952 and until the Supreme Court's
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., l ° there has been an
amazing parallel in the reasoning applied by the Supreme Court to
analyses under the earlier doctrine of "patentable novelty," despite the
limited analysis and attention paid to that doctrine. The Supreme
Court in KSR, however, broadened the horizon of the person having
ordinary skill in the art by making such person capable of almost any
combination so long as there is motivation in the art to achieve the
result effected by the combination claimed by the patent applicant.
Such analysis further obscures what appears now to have been
forgotten: patentability is a consequence of an intrinsic property of
claimed subject matter and not of the qualities or actions of the
individual responsible for its genesis. As stated most succinctly by
Conder C. Henry, a former Assistant Commissioner of Patents at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office: "Potentially every man is
an inventor."'
1I
I. 35 U.S.C. § 103 AND THE TYRANNICAL GHOST OF "INVENTION"
In 1963, Judge Giles S. Rich of the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals presented a lecture at the First Annual Institute of
Patent Law in Dallas, Texas that described the circumstances under
which the Patent Act of 1952 was passed.12 According to Judge Rich,
the impetus for a new patent act was "discontent in the patent bar"
caused by courts that "were, on the average, applying a too stringent
test for 'invention"' and, consequently, downgrading the "practical
value of patents."'
' 3
Judge Rich then told the story of how, in July of 1949, the U.S.
House Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, chaired
by Representative Joseph R. Bryson of South Carolina, enlisted P. J.
Federico, a representative of the United States Patent Office, to draft
"an overall patent revision bill."'14 In November 1949, the resulting
"Committee Print" was circulated "to a few individuals for
10. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
11. Conder C. Henry, Standards ofInvention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
97, 113 (1950).
12. Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent-Or, Who Wrote The Patent Act of 1952?, in
PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 61-78
(Southwestern Legal Foundation ed., 1963).
13. Id. at 63 ("In the late 1940's there was discontent in the patent bar. The practical
value of patents was being downgraded. The courts were, on the average, applying a too
stringent test for 'invention'.....
14. Id. at 64, 66.
544 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
comment," including Mr. Rich, 15 and then in February, 1950
assigned, according to a "well-conceived plan," to a two-man
"Drafting Committee" operating under the auspices of a Coordinating
Committee of seventeen patent law associations.' 6 The drafting
committee included Paul Rose, Chairman of the Patent Law and
Practice Committee of the American Property Law Association, and
Mr. Rich, who had testified at hearings conducted on previous
legislation 7 and who had been recommended for the committee by
Alexander C. Neave, Chairman of the Patent Law and Practice
Committee of the New York Patent Law Association.18 Henry R.
Ashton, President of the American Patent Law Association, was a
"virtual third member" of the Drafting Committee. ' 9
The Drafting Committee, along with Mr. Federico, redrafted the
Committee Print and incorporated suggestions of the Patent Office
Advisory Committee of the Secretary of Commerce ("containing
numerous suggestions which were piped into the Coordinating
Committee") and the comments of various patent organizations,
attorneys for the House Subcommittee and Representative Bryson.2"
The resulting bill was introduced on July 17, 195021 and circulated for
additional comments by the patent community. On December 4,
1950, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.23 Although the
provision had been in all of the earlier drafts, Judge Rich recalled
"that [the Atlantic & Pacific decision] clinched the determination to
include in the bill what is now 35 U.S.C. § 103, in order to get rid of
the vague requirement of 'invention."'' 24 A new bill was introduced on
April 18, 1951.25 "Revision Notes" for the bill were drafted by Mr.
15. Id. at 66. Giles S. Rich was an attorney at the time, practicing in New York.
16. Id. at 67-68.
17. Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 181, 188-90
(2004) (noting that when he testified in 1948 before the House Subcommittee on Patents, Mr.
Rich was a "chairman of a committee of the New York Patent Law Association which attended
to legislation.").
18. Rich, supra note 12, at 67-68.
19. Id at 66, 68.
20. Id. at 68-69.
21. Id. at 60 ("[T]he first actual bill was introduced by Representative Bryson, H.R.-9133
of the 81 st Congress, 2d Session ... .
22. Id. at 69.
23. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
24. Rich, supra note 12, at 70.
25. Id. at 71, n.13 ("H.R.-3760... 82d Cong., 1st Sess.")
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Federico, with assistance from Messrs. Ashton and Rich.26 After some
subsequent revisions, another new bill, H.R. 7794, was introduced to
the House of Representatives on May 12, 195227 and passed on May
19, 1952.28 It was passed by the Senate on July 4, 1952 with "no
knowledgeable debate,, 29 and was signed into law by President
Truman on July 19, 1952.3o
Judge Rich spoke several times over the years after 1963 on the
topic of the 1952 Patent Act, particularly with respect to the standard
for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For example, in 1964, after
summarizing the origins of exclusionary rights in intellectual
property, Judge Rich characterized limitations in early U.S. patent law
as a failure to separate "good" from "bad" monopolies, whereby a
"good patent does not monopolize something the public already has,
so as to take something away from the public., 31 According to Judge
Rich, requiring only "bare novelty" was inadequate to meet this need,
and it was not until the Supreme Court decision in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, that a higher standard was imposed 32 as a "requirement
for invention." 33 The critical language of the Court's opinion, as
recited by Judge Rich, was that the improvement that was the subject
of the patent was "the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the
inventor." 34 Judge Rich went on to explain that, although the Court in
Hotchkiss recognized that "bare novelty" was inadequate to
distinguish "good" from "bad" monopolies, decisions over the next
one-hundred years, attempting to define "invention," led to a "messy
state of affairs., 35 As a result, a commission was appointed by
President Roosevelt in 1941 that proposed the declaration, as
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 75.
29. Id. at 76.
30. Id. at 77.
31. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by § 103 of the 1952
Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 855, 859 (1964), reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 147, 154
(2004).
32. Id. ("But beyond bare novelty one must go one further and troublesome step to have a
sound system and keep the monopoly on the good side. It was not long after the 1836 Act-in
1850 in fact-that the United States Supreme Court made this clear in the 'doorknob case."'
(citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1851)).
33. Id. at 155 ("Due to the reasoning of [the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss), that the new
doorknob 'was the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor,' what came out.., in
1850 and is still with us is an injection into the law of what has ever since been called the
'requirement for invention."' (quoting Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267).
34. Id. (quoting Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267).
35. Id. at 156.
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annotated by Judge Rich, of "a national standard
whereby.. .patentability of an invention shall be determined by the
objective test as to its advancement of the arts and sciences. 36
The report of the "Kettering Commission," as it was called (after
Charles F. Kettering, who was the head of the Commission), led to
the bills discussed above that ultimately resulted in the Patent Act of
1952. The problem put forward by the Kettering Commission, as
stated by Judge Rich, "was not really to determine 'invention,' but to
determine the patentability of inventions .... ,,3 The problem
purportedly was resolved by incorporating into the Patent Act a
statutory requirement of "patentability," whereby, under the statute,
"what is patented must not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art involved, at the time the invention was made." 38 The intent,
according to Judge Rich, was to displace judicial language associated
with a "standard of invention, 39 with a statutory threshold of
patentability founded upon novelty, utility and "unobviousness., 40
The expectation, as quoted from the House Report on the new act,
was that "[t]his section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize
great departures which have appeared in some cases.'
By 1964, however, even Judge Rich was forced to recognize that
implementation of the new statute was resulting in a "mish-mash, ', 42
that was described in detail in three congressional studies, reported in
1957, 1963 and 1964. 43 Judge Rich attributed the difficulties to
various characterizations of the new law as a "mere codification, '"44 as
opposed to replacement of judicial attempts at establishing a
"standard of invention," with a requirement of "unobviousness to a
36. Id. (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 78-239, at 10 (1943)) (emphasis added).
37. Rich, supra note 31, at 156.
38. Id. at 157.
39. Id. ("This is not a 'standard of invention' and it is not called a requirement of
invention.")
40. Id. at 158. ("In section 103 Congress made such a policy declaration. It did not there
declare what should constitute 'invention.' It was a statement of something to take the place of
this vague concept.")
41. Id. at 157 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 7 (1952)).
42. Id. at 158.
43. Id. at 159. (citing SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH
CONG., EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION, STUDY NO. 7 (Comm.
Print 1958); S. Rep. No. 88-107, at 11 (1963); S. Rep. No. 86-1018, at 11 (1964)).
44. id. ("[T]he members of the bar have a lot to answer for in creating and perpetuating
the mish-mash because it is they who ... played down section 103 and persuaded a number of
courts that it made no change whatever but was 'mere codification."')
2009] STATUTORY NON-OBVIOUSNESS AS NOVELTY 547
particular kind of person at a particular time., 45 Despite the fact that
twelve years had passed since passage of the new act, Judge Rich was
of the opinion that the courts would come to a "common
interpretation" of the statute over time:
I cite these as straws in the wind. A study of the Columbian Law
Review last year concludes that "nothing indicates that the courts
are moving toward a common interpretation of the statute." I am
not so sure. I say give them time. We have only had the statute for
a dozen years and the judges who have been there that long, as
many of them have, are still indoctrinated with the old "standard of
invention" terminology that they learned from the old patent
lawyers and the old textbooks. There will be new editions of all
three in due course.
4 6
In a 1972 article, "Laying the Ghost of the 'Invention'
Requirement," Judge Rich again explained the statutory requirement
of non-obviousness.4 7 Despite acknowledging clarification in 1966 by
the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere, Co. (and its companion
cases Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co.
v. Cook Chemical Co.),48 and in United States v. Adams,4 9 Judge Rich
stated that he and others saw that "confusion remains rampant in the
courts and has arisen even in the Supreme Court....,,50 He identified
himself as one of the authors of § 103 and "as the originator of one of
its principle features,' which he did not specify. Judge Rich
recounted the historical development of non-obviousness as applied to
U.S. patent law, beginning with Thomas Jefferson's proposal to
include obviousness as a defense to patent infringement in what
would ultimately become the Patent Act of 1793.52 According to
Judge Rich, Hotchkiss grafted a "qualitative measure of patentability
for new inventions, 53  onto statutory patent law as "judicial
45. Id. ("Might it not do some good and help to achieve the uniformity the subcommittee
so much desires if its own members and staff could convince themselves that the 1952 Patent
Act was supposed to replace the "standard of invention," which never was a standard, with, a
requirement of unobviousness to a particular kind of person at a particular time?")
46. Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
47. Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention " Requirement, in 1 APLA Q. J. 24-
25 (1972), reprinted in 14 Fed. Cir. B.J. 163 (2004).
48. Graham v. John Deere, Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
49. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
50. Rich, supra note 47, at 164.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 165.
53. Id.
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legislation." 54 This was a "condition," however, that, as stated by
Judge Rich, was "not much of a standard, because it was too vague. 55
Section 103, as stated by Judge Rich, "refined and sharpened" the
condition, thereby creating a "statutory system under which all
patents granted pursuant to statute do serve to promote the progress of
useful arts because, being for unobvious subject matter, they
necessarily add to the sum of useful knowledge., 56 Judge Rich
specifically denied that § 103 was "merely a 'codification,' 57 but
rather a "codification ... and revision."58 He viewed § 103 to be a
"whole new way of thinking," apart from previous judicial attempts to
define "invention" and to be "a clear directive to the courts to think
that way.",59 After summarizing Supreme Court cases directed to §
103, including certain dictum, such as reference to synergism in
Anderson 's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,60 Judge Rich
concluded with an upbeat assessment of a recently decided case by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 6' and with the Latin phrase, "dum
spiro, spero!" ("While I breathe, I hope!"). 62
In 1977, at the Bureau of National Affairs Conference
commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of 35 U.S.C. § 103,
Judge Rich retold the story of how 35 U.S.C. § 103 was drafted,
relating how he proposed to the Drafting Committee the idea of
eliminating reference to the term "invention," and, instead, to "speak
in terms of a requirement for patentability, saying how it shall be
determined., 63 Almost in the same breath, Judge Rich acknowledged
that, despite the simplicity of the idea, he was still "trying to make it
plain":
It was in the process of working out the counterproposal in 1948
that I formulated a policy in my mind which I have held to firmly
54. Id. at 166. ("The gist of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood is that the Supreme Court, like
Jefferson, sensed that Congress had not included in the statute a necessary limitation on the
grant of patents and added that condition itself. This was judicial legislation.")
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 170.
58. Id. at 171. ("Yes, Title 35 as a whole is a codification; but it is also specifically and
officially described as a codification and revision. An example of strict codification of case law
is Section 103(e) which put the rule of the Milburn Case, 270 U.S. 390 (1926), into the statute
without change.").
59. Id. at 170.
60. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
61. Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1971).
62. Rich, supra note 47, at 179.
63. Rich, supra note 17, at 189.
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since and which I communicated to my fellow members on our
committed [sic] and to the Congressional committee at hearings. It
was this: All of the trouble people were trying to remedy by these
bills attached to the undefinable term "invention," as the name of a
third requirement for patentability. "Why don't we get away from
this troublesome term altogether?" I asked, "Let's not use it at all
and say what we really mean, and speak in terms of requirement
for patentability, saying how it shall be determined."
This is the simple idea which many courts and many patent
lawyers still have not taken in. Here I am 29 years later still trying
to make it plain.
64
Judge Rich noted that "the term 'obvious' had, of course, often
cropped up in opinions and patent cases through the past century, 65
and concluded with an oblique reference to the success of § 103 in
having "some stabilizing effect," while alluding to continuing
difficulties in interpretation of the statute:
I am happy to go along with the concluding statement in Pat
Federico's APLA paper that the views of people who have worked
on the statute are "not material"-just because they worked on it-
and that "The language of the statute must speak for itself .... " It
is a good statute; I only wish all the courts felt the way Pat does.
Referring to the Reviser's Note to section 103, which Pat wrote,
I think it has had "some stabilizing effect," as the note anticipates.
But I am still wondering about his present thoughts, after twenty-
five years, on "the addition at a later time of some criteria which
may be worked out."
66
In a paper prepared for delivery at the Spring Meeting of the
American Patent Law Association in 1978,67 Judge Rich lamented the
"tyranny of words," whereby the words "inventor," "invention,"
"invents," and "invented," would have "such a magical power" that a
federal judge would deem "'nonobviousness' to be a 'clumsy' word
64. Id. at 188-89.
65. Id. at 190.
66. Id. at 192 (The "Revision Notes" accompanying H.R. REP. No. 7794 state, in part,
with respect § 103: "There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly stated in
the present statutes .... This paragraph is added with the view that an explicit statement in the
statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later
time of some criteria which may be worked out.").
67. Giles S. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution in Legal Thinking
Impossible?, in The Ultimate Condition of Patentability pt. 3, at 301-24 (John F. Witherspoon
ed., Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1980), reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 193 (2004) (prepared
for delivery on May 5, 1978 at the Spring Meeting of the American Patent Law Association in
Rochester, N.Y.).
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by comparison." 68 Again, Judge Rich recounted the development of
patent law in this country. He credited the Court in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood69 with establishing a distinction between the "degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention ' 70 and improvements that are the "work of the skillful
mechanic, not that of the inventor." 7' After summarizing
developments in the Supreme Court since enactment of § 103, he
concluded that he did not "believe that the requirement for 'invention'
is very much alive in the Supreme Court because, when one follows
the carefully considered dictates of the Court, that old requirement
will be seen to have been subsumed in the statutory requirement for
non-obviousness. 72 Judge Rich closed with a plea: "Let's not be
tyrannized by words. Let's try to hang on for dear life to the little
advances in the art of thinking about patent law that we are able to
make in our lifetimes."
73
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PATENT ACTS OF 1790 AND 1793
Although instances of exclusionary rights in novel creations have
been found dating back to antiquity,74 Venice generally is credited
with granting the first patent,75 and with enacting the first statute
creating exclusionary rights for inventors in 1474.76 Even in this
earliest patent statute, reference is made to "men of great genius," and
grant of exclusionary rights to "every person who shall build any new
68. Id. at 196. Judge Rich was referring to a speech made by the Hon. George Edwards,
U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Cir., entitled, "That Clumsy Word 'Nonobviousness."'
69. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
70. Rich, supra note 67, at 204 (quoting Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267).
71. Id. at 204 (quoting Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267).
72. ld. at 215.
73. Id. at 216.
74. See generally F.D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property,
34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 106 (1952) (discussing the early development of intellectual property).
75. G. Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 166, 168-169
(1948) ("The Republic of Venice, on the other hand, is generally credited with the first patents,
issued from case to case in [the] form of pure privileges, particularly to printers.").
76. Id. at 169 ("We can now claim the priority of Venice in recognizing the right of
inventors. Actual patents for new inventions had been granted by the Senate of Venice in 1443,
Venetian style, in 1460-more than one-and in 1473; and we now find, as a matter of even
greater interest, that the same Senate regulates the grant of patents to any inventor in broad and
general manner, by an act having the full form and nature of a law. The act is of 1474."
(footnotes omitted)).
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and ingenious device in this City."'77 Mandich specifically notes that
the act, therefore, includes "a requirement of inventive merit... ,
according to which the invention must not be a trifling, all too
obvious application of known technology.,
78
Whether "inventors" have an inherent right in their works is
fundamental to any tracing of statutory or judicial support for
threshold requirements of exclusionary rights in intellectual property.
Prager argues that there are "inherent, exclusive rights," that are "not
created but only developed or limited by statutes on privileges,
patents and copyrights." 79 Prager concludes that "patents have two
historic roots: State policies and the idea of intellectual property, 8 °
and that "endurance of a system for the promotion of progress in the
arts" cannot be based "merely on written statutes," but must have
public approval. 81 As an apparent example of economic policies
enacted by statute to promote "progress in the arts," Prager states that,
while "production of a new thing" creates an inherent right as an
extension of the idea of intellectual property, it "is equally important
to note, that if a co-producer's contribution is minor, and does not
amount to real production of the thing as an economic-legal unit, no
property right is created by such contribution." 82 Prager remarks that
the "line of actual demarcation is sometimes debatable but that the
principle is clear.",83 Moreover, Prager takes issue with commentators
who argue that a patentability requirement of inventiveness, beyond
that of being a new and useful structure or process, is a "mere 'ghost
of the law,"' and with vague reference to Hotchkiss, he dates the birth
of this "ghost" back at least two millennia:
Some writers have urged quite seriously that the requirement of
inventiveness is a mere "ghost of the law." If this be a "ghost," it
was not born in 1850 as assumed by these writers, but at least 2000
years ago. For centuries, this "ghost" had a lot of substance in the
77. Id. at 176-77 (The act stated, in part: "WE HAVE among us men of great genius....
Therefore: BE IT ENACTED that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build
any new and ingenuous device in this City . .
78. Id. at 177.
79. Prager, supra note 74, at 108.
80. Id. at 139.
81. Id. at 140 ("It was demonstrated that endurance of a system of the promotion of
progress in the arts, as well as the original creation of such a system, required more than
government-sponsored maxims; it required mainly the public approval of intellectual property.
Patents and copyrights are based on this approval, not merely on written statutes in legal
books").
82. Id. at 110.
83. Id.
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opinion of the people .... It was invisible only to the lawyers of
ELIZABETH'S Privy Council, and to them only until the people
had started to revolt.
84
In the United States, the Constitution clearly enumerates among
the powers granted to Congress that of establishing the limited
exclusive right to "Inventors" for "Discoveries" to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." 85 Although the Constitution has
no recorded legislative history, reference is made to the clause by
James Madison in The Federalist, albeit only broadly, as the
exclusive province of Congress, which Seidel quotes as follows:
"The utility of this clause [sic] will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain
to be a right in Common Law. The right to useful inventions seems
with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The states
cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases,
and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point by
laws passed at the instance of Congress."
86
It should be noted, however, that intellectual property protection
was not introduced to the United States by the power enumerated in
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution; the colonies, and
then the states under the Continental Congress, had been granting
patents before the adoption of the Constitution.87 In a few instances,
some states, such as New York, continued to grant patents even after
adoption of the Constitution.
88
The Constitution became effective on March 4, 1789. Six weeks
later, on April 20, 1789, Congress appointed a house committee to
84. Id. at note 7 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Drury W. Cooper, Some Ghosts of the Law,
23 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 319, 321 (1941) ("In the law of patents we have become so accustomed to
the application of a test of 'patentability' based upon an inference as to what one of average skill
in the calling would or would not have done, that few stop to consider whether the test has a
basis in statutory law. If it has, then all questions of its probable or possible change are for
Congress to consider. If it has no statutory basis, then the 'man skilled in the art' is a ghost
foisted upon us by the courts and, as one of the most distinguished patent judges of our time
once remarked of him, 'He is the son of a sea-cook who gives us all the trouble in these patent
cases.').
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86. Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 5, 17 n.28 (1966) (quoting Federalist No, 43, at 186 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed.
1894)).
87. Id. at21-23.
88. Id. at 22 n.38.
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prepare a federal patent and copyright bill.89 Prager remarks that the
bill, presented as House Bill 10 on June 23, 1789, was derived from
an original draft by Noah Webster.90 Although Webster's draft has
been lost,91 it appears that, in essence, it was "based on a inventor's
public claim and announcement of the metes and bounds of his
discovery," 92 which would protect an author's, or inventor's,
"natural" right.93 Furthermore, Webster supported statutory protection
for inventors and authors as an equitable exchange for the benefit
contributed by their "ingenuity and labor," as quoted by Prager from
the February 1788 edition of the American Magazine:
The authors of useful inventions are among the benefactors of the
public and are entitled to some peculiar advantages for their
ingenuity and labor. The productions of genius and the imagination
are if possible more really and exclusively property than houses
and land and are equally entitled to legal security. The want of
some regulation for this purpose may be numbered among the
defects of the American government.
94
House Bill 10 was replaced by House Bill 419' which, like
House Bill 10,96 provided for opposition proceedings. 97 The Patent
Act that was ultimately approved, on April 10, 1790,98 did not include
opposition proceedings but, instead, put in place an examination
system that impaneled the "Secretary of State, the Secretary for the
department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if
they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and
89. Frank D. Prager, Proposals for the Patent Act of 1790, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 157,
158 (1954).
90. Id. at 160.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 158 ("The public interest was then absorbed by the question of basic, natural
rights, to be secured by a federal Bill of Rights. The movement for such a Bill probably gave
support to the intellectual property idea of Webster and thereby to the early enactment of a
federal patent and copyright act.").
94. Id. at 157 (citing AM. MAGAZINE, Feb. 1788 (Webster ed., 1788)).
95. Id. at 163.
96. Frank D. Prager, Historical Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309, 321-22 (1961) (quoting H.B. 10: "And it be further enacted, That upon
petition of any person or persons to _ setting forth that he, she, or they, hath or have
invented or discovered any art, manufacture, engine, machine, invention or device, or any
improvement upon, or in some art, manufacture, engine, machine, invention or device, not
before known or used, it shall and may be lawful for the said __ to direct an advertisement to
be inserted, . . . requiring all persons concerned to appear... to show cause why letters patent
under the great seal of the United States, should not issue .....
97. Prager, supra note 89, at 164.
98. Id. at 165.
554 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 25
important, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the
United States." 99 Inclusion of an examination system was contrary to
Webster's original suggestion, which, as stated by Prager,
"proclaimed the inventor's property [was] based on his creative act
and bounded only by his correct delineation of the new area."
100
A system of patent law modeled on the French system, which
included examination,0 1 had been advocated by James Rumsey in a
letter to Thomas Jefferson dated June 6, 1789,102 while House Bill 10
was in preparation. Thomas Jefferson was in France as the American
ambassador at that time and it is not clear what influence Jefferson
had on the Patent Act of 1790. However, it is known that Rumsey had
been befriended by Benjamin Franklin as a competitor of John
Fitch.10 3 Regardless, the examination system of the Patent Act of 1790
set forth no standard by which to gauge whether an invention or
discovery was "sufficiently useful and important" 10 4 to merit grant of
exclusive rights under a patent.
Jefferson returned from France in March of 1790 to become
Secretary of State.10 5 There is nothing to suggest that Jefferson
participated in any of the amendments to the Patent Act of 1790 that
occurred prior to its enactment.'0 6 It became clear soon after,
however, that the new Act required far too much attention by the
Secretary of State, the Secretary for the Department of War and the
Attorney General, who were charged with the responsibility for
carrying it out. 1° 7 On February 7, 1791, a bill was introduced to the
House of Representatives as H.R. 121, which E.C. Walterscheid
argues was a draft of a new act prepared by Jefferson, or "something
closely akin to it."' 0 8 Jefferson's draft removed provision for
99. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (repealed 1793).
100. Prager, supra note 89, at 160.
101. Id. at 159 n.9 (noting that in France, the Parliament of Paris examined utility).
102. Id. at 158-59 (quoting a letter from James Rumsey to Thomas Jefferson (June 6,
1789), From James Rumsey in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 170, 171 ((Julian P.
Boyd & William H. Gaines eds., 1958)).
103. Id. at 160 ("Franklin had met and rejected Fitch late in 1785 and had attracted
competition for Fitch, first by Arthur Donaldson in 1786 and then by Rumsey, whose open
conflict with Fitch started in 1787."). For more of this interesting story, see Boyd, T., "Poor
John Fitch: Inventor of the Steamboat," G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1935.
104. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (repealed 1793).
105. E.C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HIST.
§ I (1998), http://etext.virginia.edu/joumals/EHI/EH40/walter40.html.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 2.
108. Id. § 3.
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examination of applications and replaced it with a registration system
like that of England.'0 9 Jefferson also proposed a defense to
infringement where "the invention was 'so unimportant and obvious
that it ought not to be the subject of an exclusive right""'1 As noted
by Walterscheid, there was "no reference to the patentability rules
which many years later Jefferson stated were established by the patent
board under the Act of 1790," and Walterscheid argues this "clearly
suggests that, at least as of early 1791, the board had yet to develop
and implement these rules.""'
H.R. 121 was replaced by H.R. 166,112 which was introduced on
March 1, 1792."' H.R. 166 did not include Jefferson's defense of
obviousness and required that the invention be of "any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, not before known or used" ' 14 and that an inventor "fully
explain the principle and the several modes in which he has
contemplated the application of that principle or character, by which
it may be distinguished from other inventions." ' 1 5 This bill was, in
turn, replaced by H.R. 204 on December 10, 1792, which became, as
amended, the Patent Act of 1793.116
Walterscheid argues that the patent board under the Act of 1790
established rules of patentability only "late in 1792 after they had
been proposed by Barnes acting on behalf of Rumsey"' 17 in a
treatise 118 commenting on the House Report of March 1792.'19 These
rules, articulated by Jefferson in 1813, were, as quoted by
Walterscheid,
109. Id. §4.
110. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts, in
22 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359, 360 (Charles T. Cullen et al. eds., 1986)).
111. Id.
112. Walterscheid suggests that "E-23848," which is an "Evans number" as identified in
Charles Evans' American Bibliography series, is in fact H.R. 166. Id. § 3.
113. Id. §3.
114. An Act to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts, § 2, 1 Stat. 109-10 (1790)
(repealed 1793).
115. Id.
116. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836).
117. Walterscheid, supra note 105, § 4.
118. J. BARNES, TREATISE ON JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN
EFFECTUAL SYSTEM OF PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, BY ASSURING PROPERTY
IN THE PRODUCTS OF GENIUS (Philadelphia 1792).
119. Walterscheid, supra note 105, § 4.
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(a) "that a machine of which we were possessed, might be applied
by every man to any use of which it is susceptible"; (b) "that a
change of material shall not be entitled to a patent"; and (c) "that a
mere change of form should give no right to a patent."
120
Barnes' treatise also proposed articles to be incorporated into the new
patent act that particularly specified that entitlement to a patent
required discovery of a new principle, or an improvement in the
principle of a machine:
Article I.
I.. JI A person shall be entitled to obtain a patent provided he shall
have discovered a new principle, in case of machines, or shall have
discovered an improvement in the principle of any machine which
is free, or patented; the latter to be called a perfective patent; or
new art, or process in case of a composition of matter.
121
Barnes' proposals appear to have been adopted in that the Patent
Act of 1793 included an additional section, Section 2, that did not
appear in H.R. 166:
SEC.2.
Provided always, and be it further enacted, That any person, who
shall have discovered an improvement in the principle of any
machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which
shall have been patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such
improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, use or vend the
original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use
the improvement: And it is hereby enacted and declared, that
simply changing the form or proportions of any machine, or
composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a
discovery.
22
120. Id. § 4 n.37.
121. Barnes, supra note 118, at 30-31.
122. Id. Patent Act of 1793. The remaining portions of Section 2 appear to derive from
Sections 1II and IV of Barnes' treatise, which state:
III. But, he who makes an improvement in the principal of any machine, shall not
be at liberty to use the original discovery or machine, but with the consent of the
first inventor; nor, shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the improvement,
but with the consent of the improver.
IV. Nor, shall changing the form, or proportions of any machine, in any degree,
be construed to be a discovery.
For further discussion of Section 2, see Walterscheid, E.C., "To Promote the Progress of Useful
Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1798-1836," Fred B. Rothman & Co., Littleton,
Colorado (1998) p. 222, n.96.
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Il. GENESIS OF A JUDICIAL STANDARD UNDER THE PATENT ACT OF
1793
Although the first patent cases under the new Patent Act of 1793
would not be heard for several years, by 1795 courts in England were
contemplating principle of operation as a test for patentability. In
Boulton v. Bull, 2 3 the Court of Common Pleas was evenly divided,
and so rendered no judgment in the case of James Watt, who sued for
infringement of a patent directed toward a method of use of a
"steam," or "fire engine."' 124 The invention did not include a novel
apparatus, 25 but, rather, an improvement in a method of use of steam
engines, whereby, to make the engine more efficient, spent steam
from a cylinder was condensed in a separate vessel rather than by
introduction of cold water into the cylinder containing the steam.1
26
The defendant argued that because there was no new instrument, or
machine, the patent could only be for "mere principles," and therefore
must be invalid. 27 In other words, since, according to English law, a
"patentee must describe his invention in such a manner, that other
artists in the same trade or business may be taught to do the same
thing for which the patent is granted,"'' 28 there can be no patent
protection for "mere principles," because, until they are "embodied
and reduced into practice," they are like "sentiments of an author,"
which, "while in his own mind[,] ... are alike the property of him or
of another."'' 2 9 By partitioning the known device, that is, the steam
engine, from the method of its use, as "mere principles," the
defendant concluded that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was entitled
to protection for neither:
Upon the whole therefore of the case, it appears either that the
patent is for an entire formed machine, when it ought to have been
for an improvement only, and in which case the specification does
123. Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.).
124. Id.
125. JENNY UGLOW, THE LUNAR MEN 243 (2002), quoting a letter from William Small to
James Watt (February 5, 1769), in MATTHEW BOULTON PAPERS, Birmingham City Archives, at
340-44 (describing that Watt was advised by his friend William Small not to include in his
patent specifications "drawings nor descriptions of any particular machinery, but specify in the
clearest manner that you have discovered some principles.").
126. Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 654.
127. Id. at 655 ("But supposing it to be a patent for mere principles (for the specification
states that the invention consists of principles) it is neither originally good in law, nor is it
continued by 15 Geo. 3. c. 61 ." (emphasis added)).
128. Id. at656.
129. Id.
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not correspond with it, or it is for mere principles, which according
to the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, cannot be the subject of a patent. 30
Not surprisingly, the plaintiff disagreed with the defendant's
characterization and linked the "principle of the invention" with the
benefit achieved "by whatever mode that effect may be produced."'' 3'
The plaintiff was careful, however, to distinguish what is known, and
therefore not patentable, from the patentable improvement:
Where an improvement is made upon a machine already known,
the patent ought not to be for the machine itself, but for the method
of improving it .... [I]f from the nature of the thing, a patent for
the new method or improvement only should have the effect of
giving a right to the whole machine, that is not of itself a ground
on which the patent can be set aside.'
32
In other words, with respect to the patented method, a new use of
known fire engines gave a right to the patent holder over known fire
engines, but only to the extent of the improvement provided for by the
patent, and this right was not invalidated by the fact that fire engines
employed by the patented method were known. The novel method
was application of a new principle to known subject matter, which
provided a benefit not previously known, and was entitled to patent
protection.
The differences among the judges hinged on the meaning of the
term "principle," and the scope of protection to be afforded to its
novel application. Two of the four judges held that a literal reading of
the applicable statute limited patent protection to "manufactures" and,
therefore, methods, regardless of any new "principle," were not
eligible for protection.
For example, Judge Heath plainly stated that the statute provided
only for "new manufactures," and that it was so limited because "it
precludes all nice refinements; it gives us to understand the reason of
the proviso that it was introduced for the benefit of trade,"'1 33 and
therefore, "the subject of a patent, ought to be specified, and it ought
130. Id. at 658.
131. Id. ("The patent is neither for a formed instrument, nor is the specification for a
principle unorganized. The former is for 'a new invented method of lessening the consumption
of steam and fuel in fire engines,' by whatever mode that effect may be produced: the latter
states both the principle of the invention, and also the mode in which it is to operate, namely, the
preserving the cylinder hot by the means described, and the condensing the steam in separate
vessels communicating with the cylinder." (emphasis added)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 660-61.
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to be that which is vendible, otherwise it cannot be a manufacture."'
' 34
The patentee, on the other hand, by asserting that the invention was
not limited to any particular embodiment, effectively conceded a lack
of invention:
If the argument for the patentee were correct, it would follow, that
where a patent was obtained for the principle, the organization
would be of no consequence. Therefore the patent for the
application of the principle, must be as bad as the patent for the
principle itself. It has been urged for the patentee, that he could not
specify all of the cases, to which his machinery could be applied.
The answer seems obvious, that what he cannot specify he has not
invented.
135
The judge concluded that the patent cannot be good because, as an
application of principle, it extends beyond the machinery specified
and is, therefore, uncertain:
This patent extends to all machinery that may be made on this
principle, so that he has taken a patent for more than he has
specified .... The grant of a method is not good, because
uncertain, the specification of a method or the application of
principle is equally so, for these reasons I have alleged.
36
Similarly, Judge Buller argued that a principle, if patentable,
would have the same meaning as the "manufacture" of the statute:
This brings us to the true foundation of all patents, which must be
the manufacture itself; and so says the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 3.... I
am of opinion that the patent is granted for the manufacture, and I
agree ... that verbal criticisms ought not to avail, but that principle
in the patent, and engine in the act of parliament mean and are the
same thing.
137
He concluded the "true question in this case is, whether the Plaintiff's
patent can be supported for the engine,"' 38 and the objections to the
patent are, therefore, that "the fire engine was known before : and
secondly, though the Plaintiffs invention consisted only of an
improvement of the old machine, he has taken the patent for the
whole machine, and not for the improvement alone."' 39 Judge Buller
drew a parallel with so-called "patents of addition," characterized as
134. Id. at 661.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at664.
139. Id.
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putting "but a new button to an old coat,"' 140 and commented that, "[i]f
the button were new, I do not feel the weight of the objection that the
coat in which the button was to be put, was old."'14 1 Judge Buller
acknowledged that patents of addition could be valid, "[b]ut then it
must be for the addition only, and not for the old machine too.',
142
According to Judge Buller, since novelty in the method of use of the
fire engine was inextricably linked with the previously known engine,
the improvement could not be patented without depriving the public
of a right to the engine and, therefore, the patent of the improvement
must be void.
143
Judge Rooke, on the other hand, took the view that, if the
invention was to be patentable, it would not be as a mere principle,
but rather a novel modification in the steam engine to effect the
inventor's method:
What method can there be of saving steam or fuel in engines, but
by some variation in the construction of them? A new invented
method therefore conveys to my understanding the idea of a new
mode of construction. I think those words are tantamount to fire
engines of a newly invented construction; at least I think they will
bear this meaning, if they do not necessarily exclude every
other. 1
44
Patentability for Judge Rooke was, therefore, clearly linked to
mechanical improvements, regardless of whether the patentee
considered the improvement to be a "principle, invention, or method":
It follows from thence, that the mechanical improvement, and not
the form of the machine, is the object of the patent; and if this
mechanical improvement is intelligibly specified.., whether the
patentee call it a principle, invention, or method, or by whatever
other appellation, we are not bound to consider his terms, but the
real nature of his improvement and the description he has given of
it, and we may I think protect him without violating any rule of
law. 14
5
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 665 ("But here the Plaintiffs claim the right to the whole machine. To that
extent their right cannot be sustained, and therefore t am of opinion that there ought to be
judgment for the Defendant.").
144. Id. at 659.
145. Id.
2009] STATUTORY NON-OBVIOUSNESS AS NOVELTY 561
Lord Chancellor Judge Eyre, admitting that "[p]atent rights are
no where that I can find accurately discussed in our books,"'146 and
referring to Sir Edward Coke as providing only "little assistance"'
147
on the subject of patents, began, like the others, with the language of
the statute, but he construed a broader definition of eligible subject
matter. Instead of limiting protection to "manufacture," Judge Eyre
included the associated language in the statute of "sole working or
making of any manner of new manufacture"'148 and relied on an earlier
case, Salkeld, to state that the term "manufacture" is to include "all
new artificial manners of operating with the hand.' ' 149 Furthermore,
"principles carried into practice in a new manner, to new results of
principles carried into practice,"'' 50 were, for Judge Eyre, legitimate
bases for patent protection under English statute:
In the case of Salkeld, the words "new devices" are substituted and
used as synonymous with the words "new manufacture." It was
admitted in the argument at the bar, that the word "manufacture"
in the statute was of extensive signification, that it applied not only
to things made, but to the practice of making, to principles carried
into practice in a new manner, to new results of principles carried
into practice. 15'
He did not, however, broaden patent protection to principles, per se,
but only as manifested in practical applications:
Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a
principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal
substances, as to be in a condition to act, and to produce effects in
any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, I think that there
may be a patent ... It is not that the patentee has conceived an
abstract notion, that the consumption of steam in fire engines may
be lessened, but he has discovered a practical manner of doing it;
and for that practical manner of doing it he has taken his patent.
Surely this is a very different thing from taking a patent for a
principle, it is not for a principle, but for a process.
146. Id. at 665.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 666 ("Under the practice of making we may class all new artificial manners of
operating with the hand, or with instruments in common use, new processes in any art,
producing effects useful to the public." (emphasis added)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 667 (emphasis added).
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It is on this basis that Judge Eyre concluded that a new method for use
of a device, in this case, a fire engine, may, indeed, be a subject of a
valid patent:
The objection on the act of parliament is of the same nature as one
of the objections to the specification: the specification calls a
method of lessening the consumption of steam in fire-engines a
principle, which it is not; the act calls it an engine, which perhaps
also it is not; but both the specification and the statute are referable
to the same thing, and when they are taken with their correlative
are perfectly intelligible. Upon the wider ground I am therefore of
the opinion that the act has continued this patent.
153
The four judges who opined on Watt's use of a fire engine in the
Court of Common Pleas, therefore, were split as to whether a process
could be the valid subject of a patent. However, on closer inspection,
it is apparent that they all agreed that the presence of a new
application of principle, or "whatever other appellation,"' 15 4 was
critical to that determination, and differed on only whether any such
new application of such principle in the form of a method could be
protected under a statute which refers only to the sole working or
making of any manner of "new manufacture."
'1 55
This same patent was again at issue in the case of Hornblower v.
Boulton,156 in the Court of Kings Bench in 1799. As in the earlier case
before the Court of Common Pleas, the argument was made that the
patent was "for a philosophical principle only, neither organized or
capable of being organized."' 57 In this case, however, decided four
years after the case against Bull in the Court of Common Pleas, the
judges unanimously upheld Watt's patent. All the judges agreed that
the method of the invention was within the scope of subject matter
protectable under the statute as a new manufacture and not a patent
for "mere principles." 158 Judge Lawrence, for example, equated a
device and method of its use under the statute as "only placing several
things and performing several operations in the most convenient
order," and contrasted manifestation of a principle to principle as a
"mere elementary truth."' 59
153. Id. at 669-70 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 659.
155. Id. at663.
156. Homblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.).
157. Id. at 1288.
158. See id
159. Id. at 1292.
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The patent was granted for application of principles, either as a
method or arrangement of component parts, and was distinguished
from "mere principles" by the "particular parts requisite to produce
the effect intended" and "the manner how they are to be applied," as
stated by Judge Grose:
This method, however, if not effected or accompanied by a
manufacture, I should hardly consider as within the statute of
James. But it seems to me that, in this specification, he does
describe a new manufacture, by which his principle is realized ....
Thus he specifies the particular parts requisite to produce the
effect intended, and states the manner how they are to be
applied... But then it is objected that the patent should have been
for that manufacture; whereas it is for principles, which the
specification describes. To which I answer, that the patent is not
merely for principles, nor does the specification describe principles
only. The patent states the principles on which the inventor
proceeds, and shows in his specification the manufacture by means
of which those principles are to take effect; which effect is to be
the lessening of the consumption of steam and fuel by keeping the
steam vessel of one uniform heat with the steam so long as the
engine is worked.'
60
Therefore, as held by the Court of the King's Bench, regardless of
whether the invention was a method or machine, patentability hinged
on new application of a principle, and extended only to that
application. Naked principle was not entitled to protection under the
statute.
In the United States, Justices Story and Washington, while riding
circuit on the Circuit Courts for the Districts of Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania, respectively, wrote several opinions for early patent
cases. One of the first of these cases, Park v. Little,' 61 was a suit for
infringement of a patent for alarm bells affixed to a fire engine (i.e.,
steam engines to be used in extinguishing fires). 162 Here, circuit
Justice Washington distinguished improvements in "principle" from
"form" by holding that improvements in "form" of the invention
constituted an "invasion of the plaintiffs privilege," while
improvements in "principle" did not:
The last question is, have the defendants by the devising or using
their bells, violated the plaintiffs right? Inquiries under this head
are-lst. Are the defendants' bells, as used by them, an
160. Id. at 1290 (emphasis added).
161. Park v. Little, 18 F. Cas. 1107 (C.C.D. Penn. 1813) (No. 10,715).
162. Id. at 1107.
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improvement of the plaintiffs? You have seen and tried both, and
can decide. 2d. Is it an improvement in the principle or in the
form? If the former, then it is no invasion of the plaintiff's
privilege-if the latter, it is. 1
63
Justice Story, whose first term on the Supreme Court was the
year before,' 64 was, like Justice Washington, riding circuit in early
1813. In May, one month after Washington's opinion in Park, Story
wrote, in Woodcock v. Parker,'65 that "a subsequent inventor cannot,
by obtaining a patent therefor, oust the first inventor of his right, or
maintain an action against him for the use of his own invention,'
166
apparently contradicting Justice Washington's suggestion that
patentably distinct improvements did not infringe an earlier inventor's
exclusive right.
One year later, however, Justice Story, in another circuit court
opinion, Odiorne v. Winkley, 167 clearly linked new application of
principle to patentability, but limited the scope of that protection to
the improvement consequent to the application, and prohibited
exclusive rights from embracing the "original" or "whole" machine as
being overly broad:
The original inventor of a machine is exclusively entitled to a
patent for it. If another person invent [sic] an improvement on such
machine, he can entitle himself to a patent for such improvement
only, and does not thereby acquire a right to patent and use the
original machine; and if he does procure a patent for the whole of
such a machine with the improvement, and not for the
improvement only, his patent is too broad, and therefore void. It is
often a point of intrinsic difficulty to decide, whether one machine
operates upon the same principles as another. 1
68
Therefore, Justice Story strongly implied that, as stated by Justice
Washington, operation of a machine according to the same principles
of a patented invention is an infringement and, although an
improvement of a machine may be patented, practice of that
improvement will also constitute an infringement, absent some
demonstration that the improvement operates on a principle that
163. Id. at 1108.
164. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC 74-75 (1985) (noting that Justice Story came to the Supreme Court in 1812, one
year before Park was decided).
165. Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,971).
166. Id. at492.
167. Odiome v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
168. Id. at 582.
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substitutes for the one on which the first patent is based. Justice
Story's reference to the "whole" machine, in context, can only mean
that a patentee of an improvement cannot secure to himself the right
to practice the earlier patented invention regardless of whether the
improvement is employed, and that if the patent for the improvement
does provide that right, it is void. The severability of the improvement
from the "whole" machine means that the patentee's right to his
improvement extends only to his improvement and does not affect the
rights of the earlier patent holder, except to the extent that the earlier
patent holder incorporates the improvement into practice of his
"original" or "whole" machine.
In 1817, circuit Justices Story and Washington issued opinions
that addressed the patent rights of one Jacob Perkins. Justice Story, in
the case of Lowell v. Lewis, 169 charged the jury that the question of
whether Perkins' pump was a "new invention" must rest on whether
the patent is "for a specific machine, substantially new in its structure
and mode of operation, and not merely changed in the form, or in the
proportion of its parts."' 170 Here, Story does not employ the term
"principle" but, instead, requires the presence of a new "mode of
operation," as the distinction from being "merely changed in form" or
"in the proportion of its parts.' 17 1 In Gray v. James,172 a case
challenging the validity of another of Perkins' inventions, Justice
Washington stated that absent evidence the two patented machines
were substantially alike in principle, the defendants in the
infringement suit must fail in their attempt to invalidate Perkins'
patent. 
73
The first case before the U.S. Supreme Court to deal squarely
with the validity of patents directed to improvements was Evans. v.
Eaton.174 The patent was directed to an improved flour, or grain, mill
owned by Oliver Evans. Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion for
the Court, upheld the patent in the face of the charge that the patent
was invalid as having been construed "to be solely for the general
result produced by the combination of all the machinery, and not for
169. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
170. Id. at 1019-20.
171. Id.
172. Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019 (C.C.D. Penn. 1817) (No. 5,719).
173. Id. at 1020 ("[Perkins' machine and Chandler's earlier machine] are materially unlike
in their parts, in their structure, and in their operation.... Or, if this be not so, it behooves the
defendants clearly to show the contrary, before the court can listen to a motion to set aside the
verdict, on the ground that the two machines are substantially alike in principle.").
174. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
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the several improved machines, as well as for the general result.'
175
Evans claimed an "exclusive right to the principles, and to all the
machines above specified, and for all the uses and purposes specified,
as not having been heretofore known or used before I discovered
them." 176 As explained before by Justice Story, in Odiorne, the crucial
distinction between patenting a "whole" machine and an improvement
to it apparently was in the nature of the right claimed by the
patentee. 177 In Evans, Chief Justice Marshall was able to uphold the
patent because the patent rights extended only to improvements in the
machine, and not to the "whole machine":
Although, in his specification, he claims a right to the whole
machine, in his petition he only asks for a patent for the
improvements in the machine. The distinction between a machine,
and an improvement on a machine, or an improved machine, is too
clear for them to be confounded with each other.
178
It was this improvement, articulated by Evans as an "application
of these principles,"'179 directed "to the improvement of the process of
manufacturing flour, and other purposes"'180 that was granted to him
as an exclusionary right:
It is, then, the opinion of this court, that Oliver Evans may claim,
under his patent, the exclusive use of his inventions and
improvements in the art of manufacturing flour and meal, and in
the several machines which he has invented, and in his
improvements on machines previously discovered.1
8 1
In the same year that Evans was decided, Justice Story, writing
anonymously, published a note, "On the Patent Laws,"' 82 that appears
175. Id. at 505.
176. Id. at 515.
177. Odiome v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
178. Evans, 16 U.S. at 516.
179. Id. at 515. The "principles" were summarized by the Court as follows:
[The plaintiff's] schedule states his first principle to be the operation of his
machinery on the meal from its being ground until it is bolted....
His second principle is the application of the power that moves the mill to his
machinery.
The application of these principles, he says, to manufacturing flour, is what he
claims as his invention or improvement in the art....
180. Id. ("He asserts himself to be the inventor of the machines and claims the application
of these principles, to the improvement of the process of manufacturing flour, and other
purposes, as his invention and improvement in the art.").
181. Id. at 517.
182. Joseph Story, Note, On the Patent Laws, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) app. 13 (1818).
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as an appendix to Justice Marshall's opinion. 8 3 In the note, Justice
Story laid out a synopsis of U.S. patent law to-date, which he
attributed in "great degree" to the corresponding English statute and
cases. 184 Justice Story relied particularly heavily on the English cases
of Boulton and Hornblower, discussed above, explaining that "these
cases were very elaborately discussed, and contain more learning on
the subject of patents than can be found in any other adjudications,
and are, therefore, deserving of the most accurate attention of every
lawyer."'' 85 Justice Story quoted extensively from both cases. For
example, from Mr. Justice Heath, in Boulton, Justice Story quoted:
Method is a principle reduced to practice; it is, in the present
instance the general application of a principle to an old
machine.... A patent for an improvement of a [machine], and a
patent for an improved [machine], are, in substance, the same. The
same specification would serve for both patents; the new
organization of parts is the same in both.
i1 6
From Mr. Justice Rooke, Justice Story quoted, "a new invented
method conveys to my understanding the idea of a new mode of
construction,"'' 8 7 and, from Hornblower, before the Court of the
King's Bench, Justice Story quoted Mr. Justice Lawrence as stating:
"[E]ngine and method mean the same thing, and may be the
subject of a patent. Method, properly speaking is only placing
several things and performing several operations, in the most
convenient order; but it may signify a contrivance, or device; so
may an engine; and therefore, I think it may answer the word
method. So principle may mean an elementary truth; but it may
also mean constituent parts."'
' 88
183. See Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254 (1961), for more details concerning the circumstances of Justice Story's
Notes.
184. Story, supra note 182, at 13. Justice Story introduced the note as follows:
The patent acts of the United States are, in a great degree, founded on the
principles and usages which have grown out of the English statute on the same
subject. It may be useful, therefore, to collect together the cases which have been
adjudged in England, with a view to illustrate the corresponding provisions of our
own laws; and then to bring in review the adjudications in the courts of the
United States.
185. Id. at 18.
186. Id. (quoting Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 660-61 (K.B.)) (emphasis
added).
187. Id. at 18-19 (quoting Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 659).
188. Id. at 19 (quoting Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.)).
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Therefore, to Justice Story, patentability in the United States, if
derived at least in part from these two cases in England, hinged on the
presence of application of principle embodied as a combination of
constituent parts, either as a method or a device. As we shall see, this
premise for patentability was present, and refined, throughout Justice
Story's presence on the Supreme Court, and heavily influenced
developments in patent law well into the twentieth century.
The first Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Story on
patent law was Evans v. Eaton,'8 9 which revisited the earlier Supreme
Court case for which Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in
1818.'9 Justice Story invalidated the patent on the basis that, although
"[i]t is not disputed that the specification does contain a good and
sufficient description of the improved Hopperboy, and of the manner
of constructing it,"'191 the patent was "defective in not specifying that
improvement, and therefore the plaintiff ought not to recover." 192 The
essence of Justice Story's reasoning lay in the statutory requirement
that "[t]he specification must describe the invention 'in such full,
clear, and distinct terms, as to distinguish the same from all other
things before known,""193 and that Evans' specification did not meet
this requirement because it did not specify the limit of the
improvement:
How can that be a sufficient specification of an improvement in a
machine, which does not distinguish what the improvement is, nor
state in what it consists, nor how far the invention extends? Which
describes the machine fully and accurately, as a whole, mixing up
the new and the old, but does not in slightest degree explain what
is the nature or limit of the improvement which the party claims as
his own? It seems to us perfectly clear that such a specification is
indispensable. We do not say that the party is bound to describe the
old machine; but we are of opinion that he ought to describe what
his own improvement is, and to limit his patent to such an
improvement. 1
94
Justice Story linked adequate description of what the inventor
considered his invention to be, as a limit of his patent right, with the
idea that patentability is founded upon demonstration that the
189. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
190. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
191. Id. at428.
192. Id. at435.
193. Id. at 434 (quoting Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836)).
194. Id. at 434-35.
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invention is "substantially new" by virtue of its "structure and mode
of operation":
From this enumeration of the provisions of the act, it is clear that
the party cannot entitle himself to a patent for more than his own
invention; and if his patent includes things before known, or before
in use, as his invention, he is not entitled to recover, for his patent
is broader than his invention. If, therefore, the patent be for the
whole of a machine, the party can maintain a title to it only by
establishing that it is substantially new in its structure and mode of
operation.
In 1825, Justice Story, in Earle v. Sawyer,' 96 refused to overturn
a jury verdict upholding a patent directed to a shingle mill that
differed from known machines for sawing shingles only in the
substitution of a perpendicular saw with a known circular saw., 97 As
stated by Justice Story, "[t]he main question was, and still is, whether
there is anything new in the improvement patented by the plaintiff."' 9'
Testimony during the trial characterized substitution of a
perpendicular saw as, in Story's words, "so obvious to mechanics,
that one of ordinary skill, upon the suggestion being made to him,
could scarcely fail to apply it in the mode which the plaintiff had
applied his."'199 Story summarized the defendant's arguments as
requiring that any patentable combination must be the product of
"mental labor and intellectual creation," or "[i]f the result of accident,
it must be what would not occur to all persons skilled in the art, who
wished to produce the same result," that the "mere putting of two
things together, although never done before, is no invention., 200 Story
wholly rejected this line of reasoning as contrary to "common sense":
It did not appear to me at the trial, and does not appear to me now,
that this mode of reasoning upon the metaphysical nature, or the
195. Id. at 430.
196. Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247).
197. Id. at 254-55 (summarizing the difference of the claimed invention over the prior art
as: "The former machine, here alluded to and patented by the plaintiff, is a machine for
manufacturing shingles, called the 'improved shingle mill,' in which a perpendicular saw, with
the appropriate machinery to move it, was exclusively used. The present patent claims, as an
invention of the plaintiff, the substitution of a circular saw, with the appropriate machinery in
the old machine, for the like purpose of sawing shingles. With the exception of this substitution,
all other parts of the old machine, . . . were unaltered.... It was proved that circular saws were
in use before, for the purpose of veneering and sawing picture frames, but they were small ..
.11).
198. Id. at255.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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abstract definition of an invention, can justly be applied to cases
under the patent act. That act proceeds upon the language of
common sense and common life, and has nothing mysterious or
equivocal about it .... 201
After quoting the statute, Story articulated a threshold for
patentability as follows:
The thing to be patented is not a mere elementary principle, or
intellectual discovery, but a principle put in practice, and applied to
some art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. It must
be new, and not known or used before the application; that is, the
party must have found out, created, or constructed some art,
machine, &c. or improvement on some art, machine, &c. which
had not been previously found out, created, or constructed by any
other person.
The manner of invention was dismissed by Justice Story, and even the
degree of utility was given only nominal weight:
It is of no consequence, whether the thing be simple or
complicated; whether it be by accident, or by long, laborious
thought, or by an instantaneous flash of mind, that it is first done.
The law looks to the fact, and not to the process by which it is
accomplished. It gives the first inventor, or discoverer of the thing,
the exclusive right, and asks nothing as to the mode or extent of the
application of his genius to conceive or execute it. It must also be
useful, that is, it must not be noxious or mischievous, but capable
of being applied to good purpose .... But the degree of positive
utility is less important in the eye of the law, than some other
things, though in regard to the inventor, as a measure of the value
of the invention, it is of the highest importance.
20 3
Justice Story concluded that the law was clear and that attempts to
read into the statute a more stringent standard posed a threat of
making application of the law more obscure:
The first question then to be asked, in cases of this nature, is
whether the thing has been done before. In case of a machine,
whether it has been substantially constructed before; in case of an
improvement of a machine, whether that improvement has ever
been applied to such a machine before, or whether it is
substantially a new combination. If it is new, if it is useful, if it has
not been known or used before, it constitutes an invention within
the very terms of the act, and, in my judgment, within the very
201. Id.
202. Id. at 256.
203. Id.
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sense and intendment of the legislature. I am utterly at a loss to
give any other interpretation of the act; and, indeed, in the very
attempt to make that more clear, which is expressed in
unambiguous terms in the law itself, there is danger of creating an
artificial obscurity.
20 4
The defendant's attempt to invoke the case law of England in support
of a standard beyond that of a novel mode was directly attacked by
Story:
How, indeed, can it be possible, that an English court should deem
some intellectual labour, beyond the novelty of the combination,
necessary for a patent, when it is the acknowledged law of England
(different in that respect from our own), that the first importer of
an invention, known and used in foreign parts, may be entitled to a
patent as the invention in England? What of intellect is employed
in the mere importation of a known machine? An inventor, in the
sense of the English law, is the first maker, or constructor, or
introducer, in England.
20 5
In Justice Story's opinion, application of a mode of operation not
previously known, in addition to utility, entitled an inventor to patent
protection.
The Patent Act of 1836,206 reinstituted substantive reexamination
of patent applications under section 7207 of the act, and omitted
language of section 2 of the Patent Act of 1793, including the
limitation "that simply changing the form or proportion of any
machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed
a discovery. ' ,20 Justice Story, nevertheless, in Wyeth v. Stone,209 drew
a correlation with the Patent Act of 1793 in a common requirement
that "the inventor, in his specification or description of his invention,
should 'fully explain the principle and the several modes, in which he
has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat, 117 (1836) (repealed 1870).
207. Id. at § 7 (stating, in part: "And be it further enacted, That, on the filing of any such
application, description, and specification, and the payment of the duty hereinafter provided, the
Commissioner shall make or cause to be made, an examination of the alleged new invention or
discovery; and if, on any such examination, it shall not appear to the Commissioner that the
same had been invented or discovered by any other person ... , if the Commissioner shall deem
it to be sufficiently useful and important, it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor.").
208. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318-23 (repealed 1836).
209. Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107).
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which it may be distinguished from other inventions."' 2 0 As stated by
Justice Story:
[An inventor] might lawfully unite in one patent all the modes, in
which he contemplated the application of his invention, and all the
different sorts of machinery, or modifications of machinery, by
which or to which it might be applied; and if each were new, there
would seem to be no just ground of objection to his patent,
reaching them all.
211
However, where, for example, the patent claims "the abstract
principle or art of cutting ice by means of an apparatus worked by any
other power than human," 212 Justice Story asserted that "such a claim
is utterly unmaintainable in point of law' '213 as "a claim for an art or
principle in the abstract, and not for any particular method or
machinery, by which ice is to be cut. ' 2 14 Generally, then, "[a] claim
broader than the actual invention of the patentee is, for that very
reason, upon the principles of the common law utterly void, and the
patent is a nullity,"21 5 just as Justice Story had asserted in patent cases
under the Patent Act of 1793.
In 1842, Justice Story held, in Howe v. Abbott,2" 6 that
"application of an old process to manufacture an article, to which it
had never before been applied, is not a patentable invention," 21 7 and
that "[t]here must be some new process, or some new machinery
used, to produce the result."2 8 Speaking generally, Justice Story
stated that, although production of an old result by a new mode was
patentable, the converse was not true; a new result was an insufficient
condition, absent "some new mode or process to produce it.",21 9 For
Justice Story, new application of a principle, or mode of operation,
was a necessary and sufficient condition for patentability, while
operation of an old process, i.e., an old application of a principle, to
210. Id. at 729 (quoting the Patent Act of 1836 § 6). The quoted portion of the Patent Act
of 1836 also appears at Section 3 of the Patent Act of 1793, and also in Section 2 of H.R. 166,
which preceded the final bill H.R. 204 that, with amendment, became the Patent Act of 1793.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 730.
213. Id. at 727.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Howe v. Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 656 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766).
217. Id. at 658.
218. Id.
219. Id. ("He, who produces an old result by a new mode or process, is entitled to a patent
for that mode or process. But he cannot have a patent for a result merely, without using some
new mode or process to produce it.").
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produce a new product, was not. Similarly, in Bean v. Smallwood,
2 °
Justice Story held that, for a device to be patentable, it must be
"substantially new," and that application of the device to a new
purpose will not make it patentable:
Now, I take it to be clear, that a machine, or apparatus, or other
mechanical contrivance, in order to give the party a claim to a
patent therefor, must in itself be substantially new. If it is old, and
well known, and applied only to a new purpose, that does not make
it patentable.... In short, the machine must be new, not merely the
purpose to which it is applied.... In other words, the thing itself
which is patented must be new, and not the mere application of it
to a new purpose or object.22 1
In one of his last opinions, issued in May of 1845, before his
retirement from the bench and subsequent death in September of the
same year,222 Justice Story wrote, in Allen v. Blunt,223 that the
testimony of those "practically engaged in the trade, employment or
business of the particular branch of mechanics to which the patent
right applies," and that of "persons who, although not practical
artisans, are thoroughly conversant with the subject of mechanics as a
science," can both be relied upon to assess patent validity.
224
However, according to Justice Story, the specific purpose for which
the testimony of each can be considered competent is different. He
explained that there are two bases for challenging patent validity:
Two important points are necessary to support the claim to an
invention: First, that it should be substantially new, as, for
example, if it be a piece of mechanism, that it should be
substantially new in its structure or mode of operation. Secondly,
that the specification should express the mode of constructing,
compounding and using the same in such full, clear and exact
terms, "as to enable any person skilled in the art or science, to
220. Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,173).
221. Id. at 1143. Under the Patent Act of 1952, the patentability of new uses for known
products is apparent from 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), which states "[t]he term process means process,
art, or method, and includes a new use of a known process machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material." See also, DONALD S. CHISUM, I CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[81[c]
(noting that the suggestion that a new use for an old product might be patentable, does not occur
until Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply, 144 U.S. 11 (1892), and that the "better view
is that this definition[, in 35 U.S.C. § 100(b),] reaffirmed the existing law on the patentability of
new uses.").
222. NEWMYER, supra note 164, at 381.
223. Allen v. Blunt, I F. Cas. 448 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 216).
224. Id. at 450.
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which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make, construct, compound and use the same."
22 5
According to Justice Story, the second point, enablement, could
be attested to by a "mere artisan, skilled in the art with which it is
connected, ,226 because "he can, from the description in the
specification, so make, construct, compound and use the same,, '227
and, therefore, his testimony "would be very cogent evidence of the
sufficiency of the specification., 228 In contrast to a "mere artisan,"
however, only a person "trained in the science to which it belonged,
would, at a glance, [be able to] ascertain whether the mechanical
apparatus or chemical compound was identical in its composition and
structure or not, or whether the differences consisted in the mere
change of one known mechanical equivalent for another.
22 9
Therefore, only a person "with a thorough knowledge of the scientific
principles" on which a patented invention depended would be
competent to testify whether that patented invention was
"substantially new in its structure or mode of operation., 230 The
underlying premise being that, as stated by Justice Story, "science
alone would be able to answer the question whether or not a particular
machine was substantially in its mode of operation new, or identical
with another, although with apparent differences of form and
structure, which might mislead the unscientific mind.",231 Justice Story
charged the jury with the distinction between these "classes of
witnesses":
I should, therefore, say to the jury that each of these classes of
witnesses was important and competent for different purposes in
causes respecting patents for inventions. But that the very highest
witnesses to ascertain and verify the novelty of an invention, and
the identity or diversity of mechanical apparatus and contrivances,
and equivalents, were, beyond all question, all other circumstances
being equal, scientific mechanics; that they were far the most
important and most useful to guide the judgment, and to enable the
225. Id. (quoting the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, at § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836) (repealed
1870).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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jury to draw a safe conclusion, whether the modes of operation
were new or old, or were identical or diverse.
232
IV. NINETY YEARS OF SOLITUDE
A. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood
As a prelude to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,2 33 it is interesting to
note that Justices Nelson and Woodbury, who would respectively
write the majority and dissenting opinions of Hotchkiss, wrote
opinions while on circuit in 1846 directed to infringement and
substantial novelty of patented inventions. In particular, Justice
Nelson, in Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner,
234
denied a new trial to the defendants because they had not met their
burden of showing that any difference in the accused infringing
device was anything more than a "merely formal alteration' ' 35 or
"mechanical contrivance, making no substantial change in the
machine, 2 36 and had failed to convince the jury that any "departure in
the defendants' machine ... constituted a material variation from the
plaintiff's arrangement."237 Justice Woodbury, in Hovey v. Henry,3 s
stated that, in a challenge to the validity of the plaintiffs patent, the
defendant must not only
show that each part or element of the combination had been known
and used before; but that all the parts had been known and used in
the present combination, and it was not a new invention, if all the
parts in a combination had been applied to a different object
before, and they were now only applied to a new object.
239
In Hovey v. Stevens,24 ° Justice Woodbury asserted that, because
it would appear to be a "very obvious change to any mechanic.., to
alter the means of attaching a cylinder with several knives in it to the
stock, so as to attach it with a single knife or cutter in it," he should
like to hear more evidence from mechanics and experts, whether such
a change merely in its fastening is a change in principle, or is
232. Id.
233. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1850).
234. Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, 3 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Conn.
1846) (No. 1,521).
235. Id. at 658-59.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,742).
239. Id. at 603-04.
240. Hovey v. Stevens, 12 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,745).
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anything which is new in principle; or whether one mode is not a
mere equivalent for the other, so as to fix one knife instead of several
in one cylinder or flange on a cylinder.24'
Neither Justices Nelson nor Woodbury suggested any departure
from Justice Story's expressed opinions regarding new application of
principle or new mode of operation as a criterion for patentability.
The question of an "obvious change" was only raised by Justice
Woodbury, and only with respect to his desire to hear "more
evidence" from mechanics and experts as to whether there was
anything "new in principle.
242
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,24 3 is widely acclaimed to be the
seminal case of obviousness as a judicial, and later statutory,
threshold for patentability, whereby a "degree of inventive skill and
ingenuity" replaced "inventive principle" as a condition of
patentability.244 The case centered on a patent for a "new and useful
improvement in making door and other knobs, of all kinds of clay
used in pottery, and of porcelain." 245 The method included pouring
metal into a dovetail-shaped cavity, the largest dimension of which
was at the bottom of the cavity.246 The plaintiffs in this infringement
suit argued that the court below erred by "[taking it] upon themselves
to determine in the negative the question whether 'it required skill and
thought and invention to attach the knob of clay to the metal shank
and spindle, so they would unite firmly, and make a solid, substantial
article of manufacture' instead of submitting it to the jury. '247 The
plaintiffs also argued that the court erred by excluding from the
instructions the question of "whether a knob of clay or porcelain thus
attached to the metallic shank and spindle were an article better and
cheaper than the knob theretofore manufactured of metal or other
materials."
248
The defendants argued that the patent was limited to
"manufacturing knobs of clay in the particular manner specified, so
241. Id. at 610, 612.
242. Id. at 612.
243. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1850).
244. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (2007) ("Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court's first major opinion
in this area, replaced the early requirement of inventive principle with a more general doctrine
that demanded a sufficient 'degree of skill and ingenuity' as a condition for patentability."
(quoting Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267)).
245. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 264.
246. Id. at 258.
247. Id. at 254.
248. Id.
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that, when manufactured they shall be held to the shank by force of
the dovetail., 249 Further, they argued that "knobs for doorhandles and
for locks had been previously patented to a person in Middletown
[Connecticut], which were made and fastened in the same identical
way as the ones described in the plaintiffs' specification,, 250 but for
the fact that the earlier knobs were metallic rather than clay.
251
Therefore, the question devolved to one of whether substitution of
metallic knobs for those of clay was patentable. The defendants were
careful to place the question before the court in the context of whether
the invention was a "new mode" and admitted that, if it were, the
patentees would, in fact, be entitled to their patent:
If in the present case the patentees had invented an improvement in
the mode of fastening the knobs to the handles, or if they had
invented a new mode of making knobs out of clay or other
materials, their patent might have been sustained; but we maintain
they cannot obtain a patent for a new use, or double use, of the
article of clay, any more than they could sustain a patent for a new
use of an old machine.
252
As we have seen, it was accepted at that time, as previously
stated by Justice Story, that application of a known machine to a new
workpiece was not patentable.253 Using an example from Boulton v.
Bull,254 the defendants asserted that discovery that a known "fever-
powder" was a "specific cure for a consumption, if given in particular
quantities," would not entitle the discoverer to a patent for the use of
255 dfnthe known fever-powder for that use. The defendants argued that,
similarly, in this case, the plaintiff was "claiming the right to apply a
common element of nature to a new purpose, without the aid of any
new mode or process of working it, and without combining it with
any other portions of matter so as to make it a composition."'256 As
summarized by the defendants:
We claim, therefore, that this patent cannot be sustained as a patent
for the exclusive privilege of using clay for the manufacture of
249. Id. at 258.
250. Id.
251. Justice Nelson summarized: "[l]n other words, the novelty consisted in the
substitution of a clay knob in the place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be." Id.
at 265.
252. Id. at261.
253. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
254. Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (K.B.).
255. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 261-62.
256. Id. at 260.
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knobs, instead of brass, silver, or metallic compositions. That such
a claim does not rise to the dignity of an invention or discovery,
but is a mere substitution of one material in place of another, for
making the same common article. There is no change proposed in
the manner of working the clay, no improvement in machinery
used to produce the result, and no new result is obtained; the same
identical knobs are produced and applied in the same way; the only
change is in the material used, and we suppose that a mere change
of one material for another cannot be the subject of a patent.257
Each of the three bases that the defendant used to conclude their
argument made reference to a "mode" of invention:
We claim, therefore, in conclusion, that this patent is void,-
1st. Because it claims in its specification to have invented the
mode of fastening the knob to the handle, which the verdict of the
jury has shown to be untrue, and therefore the claim is larger than
the invention.
2d. Because the patent for the substitution of one material for
another, without any combination, or any new mode or process of
manufacturing the article, cannot be sustained.
3d. Because no patent for the manufacture of an article can be
sustained, unless the particular mode of manufacturing the article
is specified and is new, and the difference between the old and new
mode of manufacturing is pointed out.
25 8
Justice Nelson, without reference to "principle" or "mode" of
operation, categorically denied substitution of materials as a basis for
patentability:
The improvement consists in the superiority of the material, and
which is not new, over that previously employed in making the
knob.
But this, of itself, can never be the subject of a patent. No one
will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials
better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials
of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and
cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one; or, in the sense of
the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.
The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention.
It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and
257. Id. at 262.
258. Id. at 263.
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adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for
the purposes intended, but nothing more.
259
Rather, "invention" was held to depend upon "ingenuity and skill"
beyond that of the "ordinary" or "skillful" mechanic:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and knob were required in the application of it
to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is
the work of a skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.
260
In essence, Justice Nelson turned Justice Story's analysis in
Allen v. Blunt on its head by converting the level of skill of the
"ordinary mechanic" or "mere artisan" from evidence of enablement
into a test for patentable distinction. Even so, the Supreme Court did
not explicitly repudiate or overrule substantial novelty as a test for
patentability and held in favor of the defendants who explicitly argued
invalidity of the patent on the basis that, neither in the composition of
the components, in their combination, nor in the method of
manufacture of the article, was there any new mode of operation.261
B. Hotchkiss Immediate Legacy
The question of whether the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss
intended to lay the foundation for a new doctrine in patent law should
be viewed in light of subsequent opinions, written shortly after
Hotchkiss. Courts often rely upon LeRoy v. Tatham262 and O 'Reilly v.
Morse263 to establish the threshold of patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.264 However, the Court in the majority opinions of
both cases, continued to base patentability on new application of
principle, just as in cases prior to Hotchkiss. The only issue dividing
the majority and dissenting opinions in these cases was the scope of
protection to be afforded.
259. Id. at 266.
260. Id. at 267.
261. Id. at 270 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). (Justice Woodbury, in his dissenting opinion,
made reference to "mode" only as an application of "earth," "mechanical power," or "principle,"
whether new or old, to a "new object," and as to whether an improvement was obtained).
262. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 177 (1852) [hereinafter Le Roy 1].
263. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853).
264. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981);
Lab. Corp of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
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For example, in Le Roy v. Tatham,265 decided two years after
Hotchkiss, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a verdict of
infringement by a jury in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York because the lower court judge in that case had erroneously
charged the jury, as paraphrased by Justice McLean in his majority
opinion, "that the novelty of the combination of the machinery,
specifically claimed by the patentees as their invention, was not a
material fact for the jury." 266
The plaintiffs' claimed invention was stated in the specification
to be as follows:
We do not claim as our invention and improvement, any of the
parts of the above-described machinery, independently of its
arrangement and combination above set forth. What we do claim
as our invention, and desire to secure, is, the combination of the
following parts above described, to wit: the core and bridge, or
guide-piece, with the cylinder, the piston, the chamber and the die,
when used to form pipes of metal, under heat and pressure, in the
manner set forth, or in any other manner substantially the same.
267
The lower court responded to an objection by the defendant that the
patent was invalid for "want of originality" by stating that "the
originality did not consist in the novelty of the machinery, but in
bringing a newly discovered principle into practical
application .... ,268 As in Hotchkiss, the Supreme Court did not
repudiate application of principle as a basis for patentability. To the
contrary, as had been done in essentially all cases directed to the
subject prior to Hotchkiss, a distinction was made between
patentability of a "principle" in the abstract, and its practical
application:
The word principle is used by elementary writers on patent
subjects, and sometimes in adjudications of courts, with such a
want of precision in its application, as to mislead. It is admitted,
that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right....
265. Le Roy 1, 55 U.S. at 177.
266. Id. at 177.
267. Id. at 172.
268. Id. at 174.
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... In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention.
269
An English case, Househill Co. v. Neilson,270 was quoted by the
majority as support for the distinction between a broad principle and
its application for the purpose of patentability:
It is said, in the case of the Househill Co. v. Neilson... "A patent
will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in the
discovery of a great, general and most comprehensive principle in
science or law of nature, if that principle is by the specification
applied to any special purpose, so as to thereby effectuate a
practical result and benefit not previously attained."
271
The Court then applied this reasoning to the patentees' known
combination of elements and held that "[t]he patentees claimed the
combination of the machinery as their invention in part, and no such
claim can be sustained without establishing its novelty ... 272 The
Court quoted from Justice Story's opinion in Bean v. Smallwood:
"[A] machine, or apparatus, or other mechanical contrivance, in order
to give the party a claim to a patent therefor[e], must in itself be
substantially new. If it is old and well-known, and applied only to a
new purpose, that does not make it patentable.,
273
Justice Nelson, who wrote the majority opinion in Hotchkiss,
dissented on the basis that although the "patentees have certainly been
unfortunate in the language of the specification,, 274 they have, in
essence, "claim[ed] the combination of the machinery, only when
used to form pipes under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, or
in any other manner substantially the same. 2 75 The patentees'
invention was based on the discovery that "lead, when recently set
and solid, but still under heat and extreme pressure, in a close vessel,
would reunite after a separation of its parts, and 'heal' (in the
language of the patentees) 'as it were by the first invention,' as
completely as though it had not been divided., 276 Using their
discovery, the patentees modified the prior art apparatus, patented by
269. Id. at 174-75.
270. Househill Co. v. Neilson, I WEBS. PAT. CAS. 673, 683 (1844).
271. Le Roy 1, 55 U.S. at 175 (quoting Househill Co. v. Neilson, I WEBS. PAT. CAS. 673,
683 (1844)).
272. Le Roy 1, 55 U.S. at 177.
273. Id. (quoting Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142, 1143 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No.
1,173)).
274. Le Roy I, 55 U.S. at 182 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 180.
276. Id. at 178.
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Burr, and were able by use of the modified apparatus to improve
27production. However, as stated by Justice Nelson, the patentees did
not "intend to confine themselves to the arrangement of the apparatus
thus particularly specified," 278 but, rather, believed they were entitled
to any application of the principle employed to produce pipe having
the "essential difference in its character, and which distinguishes it
from all other theretofore known,... that it is wrought under heat, by
pressure and constriction, from set or solid metal."279 He summarized
the claimed invention as an "embodiment or employment of the
newly-discovered property in the metal"280  and its practical
application:
I conclude, therefore, that the claim, in this case, is not simply for
the apparatus employed by the patentees, but for the embodiment
or employment of the newly-discovered property in the metal, and
the practical adaptation of it, by these means, to the production of a
new result, namely, the manufacture of wrought pipe out of solid
lead. 281
The English case Boulton v. Bull, discussed above,282 was relied
upon by Justice Nelson to answer the question of whether the claim
was the proper subject matter of a patent. Specifically, in response to
the challenge in Boulton that "there was no new mechanical
construction " 283 and that "the validity of the patent was placed on the
ground that it was for well-known principles,, 284 Justice Nelson stated
that, "Lord Chief Justice Eyre laid down the true doctrine, and which,
I think, will be seen to be the admitted doctrine of the courts of
England at this day, 285 whereby, as stated by the Lord Chief Justice
Eyre, "there can be no patent for a mere principle; but for a principle,
277. Justice Nelson stated:
The patentees, by their discovery, were enabled to dispense with the long core of
Burr, and to fix firmly a bridge or cross bars at the end of the cylinder near the
die, to which bridge they fastened a short core extending into and through the die.
By this arrangement they obtained a firm, immovable core, that always preserved
its centrality with the die, and secured the manufacture of pipe of uniformity of
thickness of wall and accuracy of bore, of any dimension.
Id. at 178-79.
278. Id. at 179.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 183.
281. Id.
282. See supra text accompanying note 123.
283. Le Roy 1, 55 U.S. at 183 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
284. Id.
285. Id.
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so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a
condition to act, and to produce effects in any art, trade, mystery or
manual occupation, I think there may be a patent., 286 Justice Nelson
further stated that, "[t]his doctrine, in expounding the law of patents,
was announced in 1795, and the subsequent adoption of it by the
English courts, shows that Chief Justice Eyre was considerably in
advance of his associates upon this branch of the law. 2 87 According
to Justice Nelson, the doctrine articulated by Lord Chief Justice Eyre
and "recognized in several subsequent cases in England"28 8 is
"settled":
I shall not pursue a reference to the authorities on this subject any
further. The settled doctrine to be deduced from them, I think, is,
that a person having discovered the application for the first time of
a well-known law of nature, or well-known property of matter, by
means of which a new result in the arts or in manufactures is
produced, and has pointed out a mode by which it is produced, is
entitled to a patent; and, if he has not tied himself down in the
specification to the particular mode described, he is entitled to be
protected against all modes by which the same result is produced,
by an application of the same law of nature or property of matter.
And a fortiori, if he has discovered the law of nature or property of
matter, and applied it, is he entitled to the patent, and aforesaid
.- 289
protection.
Far from breaking from earlier case law in the United States
paralleling the English doctrine of patentable novelty based on new
application of a principle, Justice Nelson embraced the doctrine:
And why should not this be the law? The original conception-the
novel idea in the one case, is the new application of the principle or
property of matter, and the new product in the arts or
manufactures-in the other, in the discovery of the principle or
property, and application, with like result. The mode or means are
but incidental, and flowing naturally from the original conception;
and hence of inconsiderable merit. But, it is said, this is patenting a
principle, or element of nature. The authorities to which I have
referred, answer the objection. It was answered by Chief Justice
Eyre, in the case of Watts's patent in 1795, fifty-seven years ago;
286. Id. (quoting Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 667).
287. Le Roy 1, 55 U.S. at 184 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 185.
289. Id. at 186-87.
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and more recently and in still more explicit and authoritative
terms.
290
Moreover, Justice Nelson equated patentability of new application of
principle with application of "genius of the inventor." The basis for
the majority opinion in Hotchkiss, of skill and ingenuity as a basis for
patentability, and earlier cases, which were founded upon "new
application of a principle," was considered by Justice Nelson to be
one and the same doctrine:
And what if the principle is incorporated in the invention, and
the inventor protected in the enjoyment for the fourteen years. He
is protected only in the enjoyment of the application for the special
purpose and object to which it has been newly applied by his
genius and skill....
I own, I am incapable of comprehending the detriment to the
improvements in the country that may flow from this sort of
protection to inventors.
To hold, in the case of inventions of this character, that the
novelty must consist of the mode or means of the new application
producing the new result, would be holding against the facts of the
case, as no one can but see, that the original conception reaches far
beyond these. It would be mistaking the skill of the mechanic for
the genius of the inventor.
291
In the context of Justice Nelson's dissenting opinion in Le Roy,
the meaning of the majority opinion of Hotchkiss, which he also
wrote, becomes clear; rather than being a substitution of new
application of principle for skill beyond that of the "ordinary
mechanic" as a test for invention, Justice Nelson equates them. In
short, at least in view of Justice Nelson's dissenting opinion in Le
Roy, the doctrine of substantial novelty, or patentability consequent to
new application of principle, is not supplanted by reference to skill
beyond that of the ordinary mechanic, but reaffirmed by it.
0 'Reilly v. Morse,292 decided in 1854, went even further than Le
Roy to explain patentable novelty, particularly of combinations of
elements as embodiments of applied principle. In that case, the Court
explicitly laid out that patentability is not precluded by the manner of
discovery by which a mode of combined elements cooperates:
No invention can possibly be made, consisting of a combination of
different elements of power, without a thorough knowledge of the
290. Id. at 187.
291. Id.
292. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
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properties of each of them, and the mode in which they operate on
each other. And it can make no difference, in this respect, whether
he derives his information from books, or from conversation with
men skilled in the science. If it were otherwise, no patent, in which
a combination of different elements is used, could ever be
obtained. For no man ever made such an invention without having
first obtained this information, unless it was discovered by some
fortunate accident.293
However, the Court also concluded that, in this case, the inventor,
Professor Samuel F.B. Morse, claimed more than that to which he
was entitled, by asserting an exclusive right to any manner of remote
communication by use of electric or galvanic current:
It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim. He
claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the mode
of power is electric or galvanic current, and the result is the
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a
distance.
... In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and
process which he has not described and indeed had not invented,
and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The
court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by
law.
294
The Court relied on the English case of Neilson v. Harford,295 to
explain the distinction between patentability of a combination of
known elements and ineligibility of patent rights to a principle in the
abstract:
We see nothing in this opinion differing in any degree from the
familiar principles of law applicable to patent cases. Neilson
claimed no particular mode of constructing the receptacle, or of
heating it .... And hence it seems that the court at first doubted,
whether it was a patent for anything more than the discovery that
hot air would promote the ignition of fuel better than cold. And if
this had been the construction, the court, it appears, would have
held the patent to be void; because the discovery of a principle in
natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable.
293. Id. at l l.
294. Id. at 112-13.
295. Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rpt. 1266 (Exch. Div.)
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Undoubtedly, the principle that hot air will promote the ignition
of fuel better than cold, was embodied in this machine. But the
patent was not supported because this principle was embodied in
it.... But his patent was supported, because he had invented a
mechanical apparatus, b' which a current of hot air, instead of
cold, could be thrown in.
The Court also recited, with approval, its previous decision in Le Roy
for the same reason:
We proceed to the American decisions. And the principles
herein stated, were fully recognized by this court in the case of Le
Roy v. Tatham and others, decided at the last term.
It appeared that, in that case, the patentee had discovered that
lead, recently set, would, under heat and pressure in a close vessel,
reunite perfectly after a separation of its parts, so as to make
wrought instead of cast pipe. And the court held that he was not
entitled to a patent for this newly-discovered principle or quality in
lead; and that such a discovery was not patentable. But that he was
entitled to a patent for the new process or method in the art of
making lead pipe, which this discovery enabled him to invent and
employ; and was bound to describe such a process or method,
fully, in his specification.
297
The Court specifically held against the idea that there had been any
extension of the patent rights beyond those laid out in Neilson's
patent:
Many cases have also been referred to, which were decided in the
circuit Courts. It will be found, we think, upon careful
examination, that all of them, previous to the decision on Nielson's
[sic] patent, maintain the principles on which this decision is made.
Since that case was reported, it is admitted, that decisions have
been made, which would seem to extend patentable rights beyond
the limits here marked out. As we have already said, we see
nothing in that opinion, which would sanction the introduction of
any new principle in the law of patents. But if it were otherwise, it
would not justify this court in departing from what we consider as
established principles in the American courts.
298
Justice Grier dissented from the majority opinion, invalidating
the broad claim to remote communication by electric or galvanic
current because there was no reference to any "specific machinery or
296. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 115.
297. Id. at 117-18.
298. id. at 118.
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parts of machinery., 299 With reference to the provision of the
constitution that "Congress shall have the power to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries, ' '300 Justice Grier cited Curtis' treatise on patents,
which applied the term "art" to "those cases, where the application of
a principle is the most important part of the invention, and where the
machinery, apparatus or other means by which the principle is
applied, are incidental only and not of the essence of the
invention." 30 1 Justice Grier stated that, where "a man may discover
some new process, or new application of a known principle, element,
or power of nature, to the advancement of the art ... [he] will be
entitled to a patent for the same, as 'an improvement in the art,"' or,
in the alternative, "he may invent a machine to perform a given
function, and then he will be entitled to a patent only for his
machine. 3 °2 And, although, "mere discovery of a new element, or
law, or principle of nature, without any valuable application of it to
the arts, is not the subject of a patent, ' 30 3 Justice Grier stated that
"[w]hen a new and hitherto unknown product or result, beneficial to
mankind, is effected by a new application of any element of
nature, .... it cannot be denied that such invention or discovery is
entitled to the denomination of a 'new and useful art."' 30 4 Justice
Grier's objection to the majority opinion was in the Court's limiting
Morse's patent to a specific mechanical embodiment when the
discovery was a new application of principle that constituted a "new
and useful art," which Justice Grier argued was entitled to patent
protection. The result of failing to protect an inventor who had made
an "improvement in the art by application of a new principle," was,
for Justice Grier, an annulment of the patent law:
A construction of the law which protects such an inventor, in
nothing but the new invented machines or parts of machinery used
in the exercise of his art, and refuses it to the exercise of the art
itself, annuls the patent law.... To look at an art as nothing but a
combination of machinery, and give it protection only as such,
299. Id. at 128-29 (Grier, J., dissenting).
300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
301. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 130 (Grier, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA § 90 (2d ed. 1854)).
302. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 131.
303. Id. at 132.
304. Id. at 133.
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against the use of the same or similar devices or mechanical
equivalents, is to refuse it protection as an art. It ignores the
distinction between an art and a machine; it overlooks the clear
letter and spirit of the statute; and leads to inextricable difficulties.
It is viewing a statue or a monument through a microscope.
30 5
Justice Grier was in agreement with Justices Nelson and McLean in
their approval in Le Roy30 6 of Househill v. Neilson:30 7
I do not intend to review the English cases which adopt the
principle for which I now contend, notwithstanding their narrow
statute; but would refer to the opinion of my brother Nelson; and
will add, that Mr. Justice McLean, in delivering the opinion of the
court in that case, quotes with approbation the language of Lord
Justice Clerke, in the Neilson case, which is precisely applicable to
the question before us. He says: "The specification does not claim
anything as to form, nature, shape, materials, numbers, or
mathematical character of the vessel or vessels in which the air is
to be heated, or as to the mode of heating such vessels." Yet this
patent was sustained as for a new application of a known element;
or, to use correct language, as an improvement in the art of
smelting iron, without any regard to the machinery or parts of
machinery used in the application. Such I believe to be the
established doctrine of the English courts.
30 8
In 1860, the Supreme Court again heard Le Roy v. Tatham.
30 9
The Court reversed its earlier decision, and held that patentability in a
process could be found, despite lack of novelty in the machinery
employed in its application, to obtain new results:
If it be admitted that the machinery, or a part of it, was not new
when used to produce the new product, still it was so combined
and modified as to produce new results, within the patent law. One
new and operative agency in the production of the desired results
would give novelty to the entire combination.
310
Further, as applied to the facts of the case, where "it must be observed
that the machinery used was admitted to be old, and any difference in
form and strength must arise from the mode of manufacturing the
pipes,' the Court agreed that there was "invention" in "bringing a
305. Id.
306. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).
307. Househill Co. v. Neilson, I WEBS. PAT. CAS. 673, 683 (1844).
308. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 132 (Grier, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
309. Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 132 (1859) [hereinafter LeRoy 11].
310. Id. at 139.
311. ld. at 138.
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newly-discovered principle into practical effect,"'3 12 regardless of
"[w]hether the new manufacture was the result of frequent
experiments or of accident," so long as the process has been
demonstrated to the satisfaction of all observers.313 The Court upheld
the patent on this basis. "It is rare that so clear and satisfactory an
explanation is given to machinery which performs the important
functions above specified. We are satisfied that the patent is
sustainable, and that the complainants are entitled to the relief
claimed by them."314 Interestingly, there is no mention of Hotchkiss in
Le Roy I, 0 'Reilly or Le Roy II, despite the fact that the patent was
compared to earlier methods known in the art; 315 new application of
principle, supported by sufficient explanation, was sufficient to
support patentability.
The Patent Act of 1870316 replaced section 6 of the Patent Act of
1836317 requiring that an inventor "fully explain the principle and the
several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that
principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other
inventions,"'3 18 with language in section 26 of the new Act that "he
shall explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which he has
contemplated applying that principle so as to distinguish it from other
inventions." 319 The change thereby, in essence, maintained the
statutory language requiring explanation of a distinguishing
"principle" of the invention. In an early case under the new statute,
312. Id. at 139.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 141.
315. Justice McLean in Le Roy 1I summarized the prior art in comparison to the subject,
Hanson, patent as follows:
Up to the year 1837, the date of Hanson's invention, two methods only were
known of making wrought pipe from lead, in the set or solid state, and these were
the Burr method and the draw-bench method. As soon as the plan of the Hansons
was introduced, they superseded all other methods.
Both of the above methods were defective - the draw-bench on account of the
great labor, limited length of pipe produced, and unequal thickness; and the Burr,
because of the difficulty of holding the core central in the die, in forming pipes of
small calib[er].
The superiority of the Burr method, for the general purposes of manufacturing
leaden pipes which requires different sizes to be made, was so slight, as it seems,
that for seventeen years after the date of the Burr patent, not one of such
machines was put in use in the United States or in Europe.
Id. at 140.
316. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (repealed 1952).
317. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
318. Patent Act of 1836 § 6.
319. Patent Act of 1870 § 26.
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Hicks v. Kelsey,320 the Supreme Court relied on Hotchkiss to hold that
substitution of a "curve of iron instead of wood and iron," where the
purpose, the means of accomplishing the purpose, and the "form of
the reach and mode of operation" are the same, was "void for want of
novelty in the alleged invention." 32 1 There was no indication by the
Court that Hotchkiss represented any fundamental break with earlier
decisions addressing patentability, or, more specifically, that
Hotchkiss added any new requirement beyond that of novelty. To the
contrary, the Court asserted that "[c]ases have frequently arisen in
which substantially the question now presented has been discussed,"
and recited Hotchkiss only because "none can be cited more directly
in point."
322
On the same day that Hicks was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Hailes v. Van Wormer,32 3 held a new combination to be patentable if
it provides new and useful results, even where "all the constituents of
the combination were well known and in common use before the
combination was made," although the "results must be a product of
the combination, and not a mere aggregate of several results each the
complete product of one of the combined elements.' 3 24 In this case,
the patentee claimed a stove that combined a "self-feeding" feature
with a "revertible draft" component, each of which operated
independently of the other.325 The Court stated that "[m]erely bringing
old devices into juxtaposition, and there allowing each to work out its
own effect without the production of something novel, is not
invention." 326 In other words, there must be production of a "new and
useful result the joint product of the elements of the combination and
320. Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 670 (1873).
321. Justice Bradley stated:
The question is whether the mere change of material-making the curve of iron instead of wood
and iron-was a sufficient change to constitute invention; the purpose being the same, the means
of accomplishing it being the same, and the form of the reach and mode of operation being the
same.
In our judgment, the patent in this case is void for want of novelty in the alleged invention.
Id. at 673-74.
322. Id. at 674 ("Cases have frequently arisen in which substantially the question now
presented has been discussed. Perhaps, however, none can be cited more directly in point than
that of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood ... ").
323. Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353 (1873).
324. Id. at 368.
325. Id. at 367-68.
326. Id. at 368.
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something more than an aggregate of old results. 327 Hotchkiss was
not mentioned by the Court.
In May of 1874, the Supreme Court decided the Corn-Planter
Patent; Brown v. Guild, Same v. Selby,328 in which several patents that
issued consequent to reissue of each of two original patents were
separately either sustained or held invalid. Of the ten new patents,
five from each of the two patents surrendered during reissue, the
validity of four of the patents from the first and one patent from the
second of the surrendered patents were upheld or not considered by
the Court. The remaining reissued patents, 1037 and 1091 through
1094, all were held invalid as embodying only minor changes from
the prior art, and without reference to Hotchkiss.329
In dissent, Justice Clifford invoked the statutory requirement that
the inventor, "in the case of a machine ... must explain the principle
thereof,. . . so as to distinguish it from other inventions, ' '13 0 and
asserted that, although "a new and useful combination consisting of
old ingredients may be the proper subject of letters-patent if the
combination produces a new and useful result, . . . the act of Congress
does not authorize the patentee to surrender such a patent and to
327. Id.
328. Corn-Planter Patent; Brown v. Guild, Same v. Selby, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 181 (1874).
329. Id. at 217-32. ("There is nothing in the particular form and shape of the appellants'
runner [of reissue 1037] which is sufficiently diverse from others that preceded it, to entitle it to
the merit of an invention. . . . The device was not altered by Brown substantially, in form,
operation, or purpose .... It seems to us that it was simply the application of an old device to a
new use. We are of opinion, therefore, that reissue 1091 is void .... After careful consideration
of this claim [of reissue 1092], we are brought to the conclusion that the subject of it is not
patentable .... [lit can hardly be contended that the proper location of the seat for effecting the
same object [as that of prior inventions], required the exercise of inventive power .... But thus
modified, [reissue 1093] would substantially correspond with reissue 1038, being simply for a
mode of doing that.... employing only in addition the mode of operation used by Kirkham. In
other respects the two combinations would be precisely the same. We are of opinion, therefore,
that this patent cannot be sustained. . . . The next patent, reissue 1094, is for a matter too
frivolous to form the subject of invention. No mechanic of any skill would construct a machine
of the character described without providing some such arrangement. This patent is not
sustained.").
330. Justice Clifford stated:
Applicants for a patent are required to file in the Patent Office a written
description of their invention and of the manner and process of making,
constructing, and using the same ... and in the case of a machine he must explain
the principle thereof and the best mode in which he has contemplated applying
that principle, so as to distinguish it from other inventions. Patents granted
without a compliance with those conditions are invalid, as the express
requirement of the act of Congress is that every inventor or discoverer shall do
so, before he shall receive a patent for his invention or discovery.
Id. at 235-36 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
592 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L... [Vol. 25
reissue the same for the separate ingredients .... ,,331 Justice Clifford
explained that "[v]alid patents may be granted for a new combination
of old ingredients, provided it appears that the new combination
produces a new and useful result, but the invention in such a case
consists entirely in the new combination .... The reasons that
Congress limited each combination of components to a single patent
were, according to Justice Clifford, "for the plain reason that the
ingredients are old, and for the additional reason that a patent for a
separate ingredient is not the same as the combination of several
ingredients. 333 At least for Justice Clifford, then, patentability of a
combination of known components to produce a new and useful result
was founded upon an application of principle that was distinct from
other inventions. As in the majority opinion, there was no mention of
Hotchkiss.
In 1875, the Supreme Court, in Collar Co. v. Van Dusen334
denied validity of a reissued patent directed to an improvement in
paper shirt collars and cited Hotchkiss for support:
Nothing short of invention or discovery will support a patent for a
manufacture any more than for an art, machine, or composition of
matter, for which proposition there is abundant authority in the
decisions of this court.
335
The Court, however, then went on to reaffirm "principle in a
machine" as the basis of "invention" that is the property of its
discoverer:
Where a person has discovered a new and useful principle in a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, he may employ
other persons to assist in carrying out that principle, and if they, in
the course of experiments arising from that employment, make
discoveries ancillary to the plan and preconceived design of the
employer, such suggested improvements are in general to be
regarded as the property of the party who discovered the original
principle, and they may be embodied in his patent as part of his
invention.
33 6
331. id. at 238-39.
332. Id. at 244.
333. Id. at 239.
334. Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530 (1874).
335. Id. at 563.
336. Id. at 563-64 (emphasis added).
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Later that same year, in Brown v. Piper,337 the Court again held
that new application by a patentee of an old process "without any
exercise of inventive faculty" cannot "be deemed new or original in
the sense of the patent law." 338 The Court held that this was "fatal to
the patent,, 339 and relied on Hotchkiss, as well as several cases that
preceded it, including Howe v. Abbott3 40 and Bean v. Smallwood,
341
both decided by Justice Story.342
Reckendorfer v. Faber343 decided the patentability of a pencil
"composed of a wooden sheath and lead core, having one end of the
sheath enlarged and recessed to constitute a receptacle for an eraser,
or other similar article .... As a preliminary matter, the Court
addressed a challenge by the plaintiff to the capacity of the courts to
examine decisions by the Commissioner for Patents. The Court
summarized six of the "most recent cases" decided by the Supreme
Court relating to patents, of which Hotchkiss was the first listed, and
held in the affirmative, namely, that "the validity of the patent is
subject to an examination by the courts., 345 Notably, the Court did not
assert Hotchkiss to be the first case to represent any patent law
doctrine; but rather only for the proposition that mere substitution to
obtain a "cheaper" or "better" result was "not the subject of the
patent. '3
46
The Court then decided the patentability of the claimed pencil
and held that the "combination, to be patentable, must produce a
different force or effect, or result in the combined forces or processes,
from that given by their separate parts. There must be a new result
337. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37 (1875).
338. Id. at 41.
339. Id.
340. Howe v. Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 656 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842).
341. Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843).
342. Brown, 91 U.S. at 41.
343. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1876).
344. Id. at 349.
345. Id. at 354-55 (Justice Hunt stated: "Upon the proposition that the decision of the
commissioner on the question of invention, its utility and importance, is conclusive, and that the
same is not open to examination in the courts, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
proposition is unsound. His decision in the allowance and issue of a patent creates a prima facie
right only; and, upon all the questions involved therein, the validity of the patent is subject to an
examination by the courts.").
346. Id. at 352 (Justice Hunt summarized Hotchkiss as follows, in part: "The precise
question argued in this court [in Hotchkiss] and decided was of the patentability of this
invention, and it was held not to be patentable. The only thing claimed as new was the
substitution of a knob made of clay or porcelain for one made of wood. This, it was said, might
be cheaper or better; but it was not the subject of a patent.").
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produced by their union: if not so, it is only an aggregation of separate
elements. 3 47 The patents in suit were held to claim only aggregations
and, therefore, were not valid because there was no difference in
principle:
In the case we are considering, the parts claimed to make a
combination are distinct and disconnected. Not only is there no
new result, but no joint operation .... The principle is the same in
both instances .... This, however, is not invention within the
patent law, as the authorities cited fully show.
34 8
In Dunbar v. Myers,3 49 decided later in the same year as
Reckendorfer, the Court cited Hotchkiss for the following proposition:
Invention or discovery is the requirement which constitutes the
foundation of the right to obtain a patent; and it was decided by
this court more than a quarter of a century ago, that unless more
ingenuity and skill were required in making or applying the said
improvement than are possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there is absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitutes the essential elements of
every invention.
350
This assertion was essentially a restatement of the language in
Hotchkiss, and like the Court in Hotchkiss, did not disavow case law
before or since Hotchkiss that based "invention" on a new application
of principle. Moreover, the following reasoning in Dunbar seems to
track Justice Story's view in Allen v. Blunt that expert testimony is to
be relied upon to identify some new application of principle as a basis
for patentability:
Nor is any argument necessary to show that the employment of
one deflecting plate covering the upper part of the stiffening plate
on the same side of the circular saw is old ....
Concede that, and still it is insisted by the complainants that
they employ or use two deflecting plates, one placed on each side
of the saw ....
Expert witnesses were examined upon the point.., and one of
the most intelligent and learned of his class testified. . . that it
required no invention to apply a second plate in such a case to
347. Id. at 357.
348. Id at 357-58 (emphasis added).
349. Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187 (1876).
350. Id. at 197.
2009] STATUTORY NON-OBVIOUSNESS AS NOVELTY 595
perform exactly the same duty as the one previously applied on the
opposite side of the saw.
351
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite
Co.,352 also made reference to Hotchkiss, but only narrowly, as in
Reckendorfer. The patent at issue in Smith was directed to a method
developed by a Dr. John A. Cummings, a dentist in Boston, of
forming and setting plates of teeth employing "rubber, or some other
elastic substance, so compounded with sulfur, lead, and other similar
substances as to form a hard gum, or whalebone gum, rigid enough
for the purposes of mastication, and pliable enough to yield a little to
the mouth. 353 The Court held that the patent was valid, despite the
argument that the material employed to bond the plate was a "mere
substitution" and, therefore, void in view of Hotchkiss.354 Specifically,
with respect to Hotchkiss, the Court stated:
The improvement [in Hotchkiss], therefore, was nothing more than
the substitution of one material for another in constructing an
article. The clay or porcelain door-knob had no properties of
functions which other door-knobs made of different materials had
not. It was cheaper, and perhaps more durable; but it could be
applied to no new use, and it remedied no defects which existed in
other knobs. Hence it was ruled that the alleged improvement was
not a patentable invention. The case does decide that employing
one known material in place of another is not an invention, if the
result be only greater cheapness and durability of the product. But
this is all. It does not decide that no use of one material in lieu of
another in the formation of a material manufacture can, in any
case, amount to invention, or be the subject of a patent. If such a
substitution involves a new mode of construction, or develops new
uses and roperties of the article formed, it may amount to
invention.
3Fr
The Court then relied on Hicks,356 which also cited Hotchkiss,357
to positively assert patentability where "there is some such new and
351. Id. at 194-96.
352. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
353. Id. at 490.
354. Id. at 492 (Justice Strong stated: "Among these the one perhaps most earnestly urged
is the averment that the device described in the specification was not a patentable invention, but
that it was a mere substitution of vulcanite for other materials .... If this is in truth all that the
thing described and patented was, . . . it may be conceded that it constituted no invention. So
much is decided in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. But such is not our understanding of the device
described and claimed.").
355. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
356. Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 670 (1873).
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useful result, where a machine has acquired new functions and useful
properties, ... though the only change made in the machine has been
supplanting one of its materials by another." 358 Dr. Cummings'
method of forming and setting dental plates was stated by the Court,
without further reliance on Hotchkiss, to be based on improvements
that were "too many and too great to be ascribed to mere mechanical
skill," and, therefore, "may justly be regarded as the results of
inventive effort, and as making the manufacture of which they are
attributes a novel thing in kind, and consequently patentable as
such., 35 9 Hand-in-glove with this conclusion was the assertion that
nothing in the art was suggestive of the patented invention and that,
therefore, Cummings' claimed subject matter was novel:
We need go no farther into a consideration of the various devices
and publications offered to show that the manufacture patented
was known before Cummings invented it. Suffice it to say, that
none of them, in our opinion, suggest or exhibit in substance such a
manufacture. The defen[s]e of want of novelty is, therefore, not
sustained.
360
In Pearce v. Mulford,36 1 the Supreme Court explicitly equated,
under the test of "invention," exercise of "ordinary mechanical skill"
and "what is obvious to a person skilled in the art to which it relates":
We cannot think the advance which the patentee made upon that
can be called invention .... It is nothing more than the exercise of
ordinary mechanical skill.... But all improvement is not
invention, and entitled to protection as such. Thus to entitle it, it
must be the product of some exercise of the inventive faculties, and
it must involve something more than what is obvious to persons
skilled in the art to which it relates.
362
357. ld. at 674.
358. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 496-97 (1876) (As stated by
the Court: "This was intimated very clearly in the case of Hicks v. Kelsey, where it was said,
'The use of one material instead of another in constructing a known machine is, in most cases,
so obviously a matter of mere mechanical judgment, and not of invention, that it cannot be
called an invention, unless some new and useful result, as increase of efficiency, or a decided
saving in the operation, be obtained.' But where there is some such new and useful result, where
a machine has acquired new functions and useful properties, it may be patentable as an
invention, though the only change made in the machine has been supplanting one of its materials
by another. This is true of all combinations, whether they be of materials or processes.").
359. Id. at 497.
360. Id. at 499.
361. Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112 (1880).
362. Id. at 117-18.
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There is in this holding by the Supreme Court no assessment of
whether there has been any "new application of principle" or new
mode of invention. The patent in Pearce was held void for lack of
"invention," or "patentability," wholly apart from the statutory
requirement of novelty.363 Strikingly, however, there is no mention of
Hotchkiss anywhere in Pearce by the appellants, the appellees, or the
Court.
After Pearce, "principle" and "mode of invention" are often
given only occasional reference. For example, in Pickering v.
McCullough,364 the Supreme Court invalidated a patent directed to
manufacture of crucibles in a plaster mould as a combination of old
elements, in which "no one of them gives any additional efficiency to
the others, or changes in any way the mode or result of its action. 365
With respect to the prior art, the Court found that "[i]n the case of this
apparatus the mould was known, and a rib or former was known,"
366
the difference lying in substitution of a rib.367
In Heald v. Rice,368 on the other hand, the Court quoted
Hotchkiss at length, and again went back to the idea of principle to
determine patentability:
There was no patentable invention in Rice's adaptation.... The
Morey attachment had been already invented. The idea and
principle of its operation, in adapting boilers to use of straw as a
fuel, was the essence of his invention. Rice, it is confessed,
discovered nothing more than that ....
... If Morey's patent is for a combination, it is a combination of
the straw-feeding attachment with all boilers for generating steam,
when it is desired to use straw for fuel, and therefore includes the
very combination claimed by Rice.
369
363. Id. at 118 (The Court stated: "In this case neither the tubing, nor the open link formed
of tubing, nor the process of making either the open or the closed link, nor the junction of closed
and open links in a chain, was invented by the patentee. We are, therefore, constrained to hold
that the first claim of the patent, even if not void for want of novelty, is void for want of
patentability.").
364. Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310 (1881).
365. Id. at 318.
366. Id.
367. Id. ("This rib Nimmo substituted for the old one in the same combination. And this is
the whole of the invention. Upon the principles stated, there is no invention in it.").
368. Heald v. Rice, 104 U.S. 737 (1881).
369. Id. at 754-56 (emphasis added).
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None of the Supreme Court cases immediately following
Hotchkiss repudiated doctrine relying on the presence of a new
application of principle or mode of operation as a prerequisite to
patentability. On the contrary, as we have seen, many of those cases
and opinions, including those by the justices who presided over
Hotchkiss, reaffirmed the earlier doctrine-Hotchkiss was not
considered to be a watershed case.
C. "That Impalpable Something"
370In 1882, the Supreme Court in Loom Co. v. Higgins
introduced the notion of impermissible hindsight reconstruction. The
Court in that case stated, in response to an argument that the claimed
invention was a "mere aggregation of old devices, 371 that "we cannot
yield our assent to the argument, that the combination of the different
parts or elements for attaining the object in view was so obvious as to
merit no title to invention." 372 The Court, instead, argued it "may be
laid down as a general rule, though perhaps not an invariable one, that
if a new combination and arrangement of known elements produce a
new and beneficial result, never attained before, it is evidence of
invention., 373 The Court explained that "[i]f the thing could not be
understood without the exercise of inventive power, it is a little
strange that it should have been so easily adapted to the looms on
which it has been used with such striking results ' 374 and that "[n]ow
that it has succeeded, it may seem very plain to anyone that he could
have done it as well. This is often the case with inventions of the
greatest merit." 375 Therefore, as with the earlier association by the
Court in Smith, between lack of suggestion in the art and inventive
contribution beyond that "ascribed to mere mechanical skill, '376 the
Court in Loom expressly cautioned against findings of obviousness
that were based solely on apparent simplicity of successful
modification of known devices.
Between May of 1882 and March of 1885, the Supreme Court
heard at least fourteen additional patent cases that directly addressed
patent validity. In each case, the patent at issue was invalidated as
370. Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881).
371. Id. at 591.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 587.
375. Id. at 591.
376. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 497. See supra text
accompanying note 344.
2009] STATUTORY NON-OBVIOUSNESS AS NOVELTY 599
lacking "invention." There is no consistency among them in
application of doctrine, other than to find that the difference in the
claimed invention from the prior art in each case was insufficient.
377
Seven of these cases cite Hotchkiss, only generally at the head of, or
among, a plurality of cases. 378 There is no statement that Hotchkiss
established any new doctrine.
377. E.g., Packing Co. Cases, 105 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1882) ("All of the elements of the
process are old. They are merely aggregated . . . . There is nothing new either in the shape,
construction, or material of his cans."); Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90, 96 (1883) ("But the
whole invention existed in the bolt of the patent of 1860. There was no invention in adding to
the solid conical bolt the screw-thread of the cored conical bolt."); Slawson v. Grand St. R.R.
Co., 107 U.S. 649, 653 (1883) ("It requires no more invention than the placing of an additional
pane of glass in a showcase for the display of goods, or the putting of an additional window in a
room opposite one already there. It would occur to any mechanic engaged in constructing fare-
boxes, that it might be advantageous to insert two glass panes,... one next to the driver and the
other next to the interior of the car. But this would not be an invention within the meaning of the
patent law."); King v. Gallun, 109 U.S. 99, 102 (1883) ("There is as little invention in
compressing a bale of several parcels of hair tied up together as in compressing one large parcel
of the same commodity."); Double Pointed Tack Co. v. Two Rivers Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 117,
120-21 (1883) ("In view of this state of the art, there was no patentable invention, and nothing
more than mechanical skill in putting the diagonal cuts or bevels on the same side of each leg of
the staple .... The second claim is for the washer in combination with the staple of the first
claim. This is not a patentable combination. There is only an aggregation of parts when the
staple is used with the washer."); Estey v. Burdett, 109 U.S. 633, 640 (1884) ("Our conclusion is
that the absolute length and size of the valve opening was a matter of judgment, in view of the
state of the art shown, and that there was no invention in making its length and size greater or
less in a reed-board of a given width, or where the reed-board was made wider or narrower, or
had more or less sets of reeds in it, either full or partial."); Bussey v. Excelsior Mfg. Co., 110
U.S. 131, 146 (1884) ("Claim 2 is merely for an aggregation of parts, and not for patentable
combination, there being no patentable relation between a portable reservoir with a flue in its
rear side and the existence or portability of a base-pan beneath it. In claim 3 there is merely an
aggregation of parts, there being no patentable relation between a damper for the middle flue of
a three-flu stove, and the existence or portability of a base-pan or the existence of a warming-
closet."); Pa. R.R. v. Locomotive Engine Safety Truck Co., 110 U.S. 490, 498 (1884) ("In the
case at bar, the old contrivance of a railroad truck, swiveling upon the king-bolt, with transverse
slot, and pendant divergent lengths, already in use under railroad cars, as applied in the old way,
without any novelty in the mode of applying it, to the analogous purpose of forming the forward
truck of a locomotive engine. This application is not a new invention, and therefore not a valid
subject of a patent."); Phillips v. Detroit, 111 U.S. 604, 608 (1884) ("We are of opinion that,
taking into consideration the state of the art, no invention was required for the construction of
the pavement described in the patent, and that it demanded only ordinary mechanical skill and
judgment and but a small degree of either."); Morris v. McMillin, 112 U.S. 244, 248 (1884) ("It
is plain, therefore, that no such ingenuity as merited the issue of a patent was required for this
improvement, but only the ordinary judgment and skill of a trained mechanic."); and Stephenson
v. Brooklyn Cross-Town R.R., 114 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1885) ("There is, in fact, no combination,
but a mere aggregation of separate devices, each of which performs the function for which used
separately, it was adapted, and does not contribute to any new result, the product of their joint
use.").
378. Packing Co. Cases, 105 U.S. at 572; Philips, Ill U.S. at 607; Slawson, 107 U.S. at
653; Pa. R.R., 110 U.S. at 494; King, 109 U.S. at 102; Morris, 112 U.S. at 249; Stephenson, 114
U.S. at 156.
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Only one of these fourteen cases, At. Works v. Brady,379 refers to
"principle" underlying a patented invention, and even here, the Court
linked application of principle to what would be suggested to one of
"ordinary mechanical skill":
Was it invention to place a screw for dredging at the stem of the
boat? Nothing more than this was in reality suggested by the
patentee .... Would not this have been suggested by ordinary
mechanical skill? The plan and mode of an operation would have
been precisely the same .... No invention would be requisite for
any of these arrangements. It seems to us that the whole principle
of the "Essayons's" construction and fumishment, as well as that
of the patent in question, was anticipated by the "Enoch Train," if
not by the French steamers, and that a patent for that principle,
though qualified by the natural incidents and adjuncts of its
application, ought not to be sustained.
380
Perhaps not so incidentally, the Court laid out the policy for granting
patent protection as a reward to "those who make some substantial
discovery or invention. 38' What constitutes an invention is stated
more explicitly in the negative, and appears remarkably
Jeffersonian382:
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every
trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would
naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or
operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an
indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to
obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of
speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the
advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form
of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon
the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the
real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of
business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and
379. AtI. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
380. Id. at 199.
381. Id. at 200 ("The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some
substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in
the useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of all favor.").
382. See, e.g., letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Jan. 16, 1814) in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 295 (H. A. Washington ed.) (New York, John C. Riker 1857)
("The abuse of the frivolous patents is likely to cause more inconvenience than is countervailed
by those really useful.").
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unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for
profits made in good faith. 83
In one of the last of these cases in this short period of legal
history, Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Manufacturing Co.,384 the
Supreme Court held invalid a patent directed to a stamp for sealing
liquor casks with identifying marks formed of two layers of paper: a
central portion bearing a number or registration mark on one side and
adhesive on the other, and a second layer peripheral to the adhesive
portion of the first layer but on the same side as, and adhering to, the
first layer, whereby after being secured to a surface, a periphery of the
first layer would be defaced by removal of the second layer, while
preserving the registration mark.385 The Court acknowledged that
"adoption of the present taxpaid stamp, in lieu of that previously in
use by the Internal Revenue Bureau, has proven its superior utility in
the prevention of frauds upon the revenue., 386 The Court quoted
testimony of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in part, as
follows: "It is believed that this system affords the government a very
effectual protection against the perpetration of fraud in connection
with the collection of the tax on distilled spirits.,,387 Further, the Court
found the stamp to be novel, and yet denied that it was patentable:
This is what we ascertain to be the precise idea embodied in the
invention described and claimed in the patent, and which, although
we find to be new in the sense that it had not been anticipated by
any previous invention, of which it could therefore be declared to
be an infringement, yet is not such an improvement as is entitled to
be regarded in the sense of patent laws as an invention.
388
Thus, the Court denied patentability to novel subject matter that
admittedly was an improvement, even recognizing the unusual nature
of the case:
Such an increased utility, beyond what had been attained by
devices as previously in use, in cases of doubt, is usually regarded
as determining the question of invention. But in the present case
we are not able to give it such effect.
389
383. AtL Works, 107 U.S. at 200.
384. Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885).
385. Id. at 65-66.
386. Id. at 71.
387. ld. at 71-72.
388. Id. at 70-71.
389. Id. at 72.
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Having conceded novelty and improvement over "any previous
invention," the Court found a lack of "display" of anything but "the
expected skill of the calling" and, therefore, there was "in no sense
the creative work of that inventive faculty which it is the purpose of
the Constitution and the patent laws to encourage and reward., 390 In
other words, the Court held application of skill beyond that of the
ordinary mechanic apart from novelty and benefit. There was no
allegation that the invention lacked any new application of principle
and was, therefore, distinct only in form or proportion. Nor was there
any assertion that the stamp was merely the aggregation of
independently acting component parts. There also was no reference to
Hotchkiss in the decision. Rather, the Court simply found that once a
problem of "frauds upon the revenue, committed by the removal of
taxpaid stamps from packages, 391 was "seriously and systematically
studied," the remedy would be obvious to those "competent to deal
with the subject" 392:
As soon as the mischief became apparent, and the remedy was
seriously and systematically studied by those competent to deal
with the subject, the present regulation was promptly suggested
and adopted, just as a skilled mechanic, witnessing the
performance of a machine, inadequate, by reason of some defect,
to accomplish the object for which it had been designed, by the
application of this common knowledge and experience, perceives
the reason of the failure, and supplies what is obviously
wanting.
393
By 1891, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize that it had
reached a point of futility in attempting to apply any known test for
inventive merit. In McClain v. Ortmayer,394 the Court upheld a lower
court decision that a patent directed to "single-roll" or "single-curve"
springs, where "the only novelty consists in cutting the double-roll
spring [of the prior art] into two '395 was invalid. 396 Though still
broadly considering the question to be one of novelty, the Court could
not define a test for "invention" other than as an "impalpable
something" beyond "simple mechanical skill":
390. Id. at 73.
391. Id. at 72.
392. Id. at 73.
393. Id.
394. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891).
395. Id. at 426.
396. Id. at 429 ("[W]e are satisfied that a mere severance of the double spring does not
involve invention...").
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What shall be construed as invention within the meaning of the
patent laws has been made the subject of a great amount of
discussion in the authorities, and a large number of cases,
particularly in the more recent volumes of reports, turn solely upon
the question of novelty. ... To say that it involves an operation of
the intellect, is a product of intuition, or something akin to genius,
as distinguished from mere mechanical skill, draws one somewhat
nearer to an appreciation of the true distinction, but it does not
adequately express the idea. The truth is the word cannot be
defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the
inventive faculty or not. In a given case we may well be able to say
that there is present invention of a very high order. In another we
can see that there is lacking that impalpable something which
distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill. Courts,
adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process of exclusion
determined that certain variations in old devices do or do not
involve invention; but whether the variation relied upon in a
particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a
question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any
general definition.
397
The Court specifically denied the plaintiffs assertion, based on
English precedent, that "the only practical test of invention is the
effect of the device upon the useful arts-in other words, that utility is
the sole test of invention, and inferentially at least, that the utility of a
device is conclusively proven by the extent to which it has gone into
general use. , 398 Specifically, the Court reaffirmed previous assertions
limiting the scope of patentability in the United States to
considerations of novelty and utility, and of the relationship between
them:
These [English] cases, however, must not be construed in a way
as to control the language of our statute, which limits the benefits
of patent laws to things which are new as well as useful....
397. Id. at 426-27.
398. Id. at 427-28. The Court further explained the distinction as lack of a requirement of
novelty in England:
By common law of England, an importer-the person who introduced into the
kingdom from any foreign country any useful manufacture-was as much entitled
to a monopoly as if he had invented it .... In Edgebury v. Stephens, it was said:
"The act [of monopolies] intended to encourage new devices useful to the
kingdom, and whether learned by travel or by study it is the same thing.
Id. (citation omitted).
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It is evident that these principles [of utility as the sole test of
invention] have no application to the patent system in the United
States, whose beneficence is strictly limited to the invention of
what is new and useful, and that the English cases construing even
their more recent acts, must be received with some qualification. 399
Again, there was no mention of Hotchkiss. During this same
period, however, decisions by the Supreme Court were also being
made that were reminiscent of the old requirement that some new
application of principle was adequate to support patentability, even if
the added component of a novel combination embodying the new
application of principle was otherwise known. Such was the case in
Western Electric Co. v. LaRue,4 °° which was decided about six
months prior to McClain, and the opinion for which was, as with
McClain, written by Justice Brown. In Western Electric, the Court
upheld the patentability 40 1 of a patent directed to a telegraph key that
incorporated use of a torsional spring.40 2 Torsional springs were
known and had previously been used in "clocks, doors, and perhaps
some other articles of domestic furniture., 40 3 In comparing the
claimed invention to known telegraph keys, the Court held that,
there is nothing in any of these exhibits which shows the use of a
torsional spring in a telegraphic instrument, and while the
invention does not seem to be one of great importance, we think
the adaptation of this somewhat unfamiliar spring to this new use,
and its consequent simplification of mechanism, justly entitles the
patentee to the rights of an inventor.
404
The Court distinguished application of an old device to a "new sphere
of action" to perform a "new function" from "transfer or adaptation of
the same device to a similar sphere of action," which the Court, in
dicta, found to be lacking in inventive merit:
While the promotion of an old device, such, for instance, as a
torsional spring, to a new sphere of action, in which it performs a
new function, involves invention, the transfer or adaptation of the
399. Id. at 427-28.
400. W. Elec. Co. v. LaRue, 139 U.S. 601 (1891).
401. Id. at 605,608.
402. Id. at 602 (describing the invention as follows: "The invention covered by this patent
consists in the use in a telegraph key of a flat strip of metal supported at either end upon posts
by means of adjustable screws and to the centre of which the lever is fastened. The torsional
action of this piece of metal serves as a spring support for the lever. The main object of the
invention is the substitution of this torsional spring for the ordinary pivotal support previously
used ....").
403. Id. at 604.
404. Id. at 605.
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same device to a similar sphere of action, where it performs
substantially the same function, does not involve invention.
40 5
In another example, Krementz v. S. Cottle Co.,40 6 Justice Shiras
upheld patentability of a seemingly simple improvement because it
was "a new and useful article, with obvious advantages over previous
structures of the kind. 40 7 The Court reversed the holding of the court
below, that the invention was "obvious to any skilled mechanic,408 in
view of testimony by the defendant that, despite "attention
specifically turned to the subject," he failed to see the plaintiffs
solution to the problem of soldering pieces to make buttons. 409 As in
McClain, the Court made explicit the difficulty of partitioning an
"invention" from "ordinary skill of a mechanic":
It is not easy to draw the line [that] separates the ordinary skill of a
mechanic, versed in his art, from the exercise of patentable
invention, and the difficulty is specially great in the mechanical
arts, where the successive steps in improvements are numerous,
and where the changes and modifications are introduced by
practical mechanics.410
Similarly, in Keystone Manufacturing Co. v. Adams,4 1 the Court
upheld the patentability of a cornsheller that employed a series of
"wings, wheels, or projections," to "force the corn rapidly forward
into the sheller," 412 as opposed to backwards, as was done in the prior
art to prevent clogging of the machine. The Court suggested that the
fact of successful improvement after prior "repeated and futile
attempts," should, indeed, be considered:
Where the patented invention consists of an improvement of
machines previously existing, it is not always easy to point out
what it is that distinguishes a new and successful machine from an
old and ineffectual one. But when, in a class of machines so widely
used as those in question, it is made to appear that at last, after
405. Id. at 606.
406. Krementz v. S. Cottle Co., 148 U.S. 556 (1893).
407. Id. at 559.
408. Id. at 560.
409. Id. (The Court stated: "The view of the court below, that Krementz's step in the art
was one obvious to any skilled mechanic, is negatived by the conduct of Cottle, the president of
the defendant company .... Yet, skilled as he was, and with his attention specifically turned to
the subject, he [Cottle] failed to see, what Krementz afterwards saw, that a button might be
made of one continuous sheet of metal, wholly dispensing with solder, of an improved shape, of
increased strength, and requiring less material.").
410. Id. at559.
411. Keystone Mfg. Co., v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139 (1894).
412. Id. at 143.
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repeated and futile attempts, a machine has been contrived which
accomplishes the result desired, and when the Patent Office has
granted a patent to the successful inventor, the courts should not be
ready to adopt a narrow or astute construction, fatal to the grant.
41 3
In Potts v. Creager,4 14 the Court distinguished Hotchkiss, where
there was "a mere change of material for the more perfect
accomplishment of the same work," from substitution "for a purpose
wholly different," from that of the corresponding part in the prior art:
Applying this test to the case under consideration, it is manifest
that, if the change from the glass bars of the Creager Wood Exhibit
to the steel bars of the Potts cylinder was a mere change of
material for the more perfect accomplishment of the same work, it
would, within the familiar cases of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, Hicks
v. Kelsey, Terhune v. Phillips, and Brown v. District of Columbia,
not involve invention .... Not only did they discard the glass bars,
and substitute others of steel, but they substituted them for a
purpose wholly different from that for which they had been
employed. Under such circumstances, we have repeatedly held that
a change of material was invention.
4 15
Therefore, as in several earlier cases, Hotchkiss was cited only for the
proposition, applied by Thomas Jefferson under the Patent Act of
1790, and codified under the Patent Act of 1793, that a mere change
of form, without more, was inadequate to establish patentability of
novel subject matter.
Lack of suggestion in the art was relied upon to uphold the
patentability of a method for manufacturing an interlocking mesh of
wire in Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford.4 16 The Supreme Court cited
41 418Loom, 17 discussed above, to support patentability of a new
combination of old elements despite the seeming simplicity of the
invention:
The fact that the invention seems simple after it is made does not
determine the question: if this were the rule many of the most
beneficial patents would be stricken down .... There is nothing in
the prior art that suggests the combined operation of the Golding
patent in suit. It is perfectly well settled that a new combination of
413. Id. at 144-45.
414. Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597 (1895).
415. Id. at 608-09 (citations omitted).
416. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
417. Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881).
418. See supra text accompanying note 355.
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elements, old in themselves, but which produce a new and useful
result, entitles the inventor to the protection of a patent.
4 19
The Court made reference thereafter to "ingenuity" and "usefulness"
in conjunction with a lack of suggestion of the claimed combination
in the prior art:
To our minds, Golding's method shows that degree of ingenuity
and usefulness which raises it above an improvement obvious to a
mechanic skilled in the art, and entitles it to the merit of invention.
Others working in the same field had not developed it, and the
prior art does not suggest the combination of operations which is
the merit of Golding's invention.
420
There was no reference to Hotchkiss by the Court in Expanded Metal.
"Inventive genius" was listed in Diamond Rubber Co. of N. Y v.
Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. ,421 only with respect to the difficulty of
distinguishing inventive merit:
Many things, and the patent law abounds in illustrations, seem
obvious after they have been done, and, "in the light of the
accomplished result," it is often a matter of wonder how they so
long "eluded the search of the discoverer and set at defiance the
speculations of inventive genius.".. . Knowledge after the event is
always easy, and problems once solved present no difficulties,
indeed, may be represented as never having had any, and expert
witnesses may be brought forward to show that the new thing
which seemed to have eluded the search of the world was always
ready at hand and easy to be seen by a merely skillful attention.
422
As in earlier cases, acceptance and utility of change were cited at tests
of invention, particularly of novelty: "But the law has other tests of
the invention than subtle conjectures of what might have been seen
and yet was not. It regards a change as evidence of novelty, the
acceptance and utility of change as ... further evidence, even as
demonstration." 423 The Court asserted that a patentee need not
understand the "scientific principles underlying his invention.
'
"
24
Invention for the Court rested on the inherent principal of the "new
419. Expanded Metal, 214 U.S. at 381.
420. Id.
421. Diamond Rubber Co. of N.Y. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 (1911).
422. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Pearl v. Ocean Mills, 19 F. Cas. 59 (C.C.D. Mass. 1877)).
423. Diamond Rubber, 220 U.S. at 435.
424. Id. at 435-36 ("It is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able to state the
scientific principles underlying his invention, and it is immaterial whether he can stand a
successful examination as to the speculative ideas involved.").
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construction," and not on whether that principal "be obvious or
obscure":
He must, indeed, make such disclosure and description of his
invention that it may be put into practice. In this he must be
clear.... This satisfies the law, which only requires as a condition
of its protection that the world be given something new and that
the world be taught how to use it. It is no concern of the world
whether the principal upon which the new construction acts be
obvious or obscure, so that it inheres in the new construction.
425
Therefore, sixty years after Hotchkiss, the Supreme Court, despite
reference to "inventive genius," "merely skillful attention,"
"acceptance and utility of change," and even to what would "seem
obvious," still laid out new application of principle as fundamental to
patentable novelty.
Reliance on principle was a test for invention in Concrete
Appliances Co. v. Gomery,426 where the question to be addressed was
"whether the combination is novel and whether it passes the line
sometimes tenuous and difficult of ascertainment which separates
mechanical skill from invention. 4 27 The Court took judicial notice
that the principle underlying the claimed method of delivering wet
concrete was known,4 2 8 and held that the patented device was merely
the product of "ordinary mechanical skill and not of inventive
genius. 42 9 Shortly thereafter, in another case that dealt with a patent
directed to transport of wet concrete, Powers-Kennedy Contracting
Corp. v. Concrete Mixing & Conveying Co.,430 the Court contrasted
"new principles" with "a mere change in proportion," which the Court
associated with "no more than mechanical skill" and consequent lack
of invention:
It remains to discuss whether there is foundation for the claim
that McMichael discovered new principles, namely that concrete
425. Id. at 436.
426. Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177 (1925).
427. Id. at 180.
428. Id. at 180-81 (The Court stated: "It is a fact of which we may take judicial notice...
that the principle of conveying and distributing a mobile substance by gravity has found
exemplification for centuries .... Long prior to the Callahan application the principle had been
applied to other substances capable of flow under the action of gravity, such as grain, coal,
crushed stone, sand and iron ore.").
429. Id. at 185 ("The adaptation independently made by engineers and builders of these
familiar appliances ... in combination of well known mechanical elements was the product only
of ordinary mechanical and engineering skill and not of inventive genius.").
430. Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp. v. Concrete Mixing & Conveying Co., 282 U.S.
175 (1930).
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could be moved by compressed air, or that if it could not be
satisfactorily moved by pressure of compressed air or other fluid
agent, it could so be moved by a nozzle which cut off portions of
the mass and drove them through the delivery duct like pistons.
Methods and apparatus for moving concrete by compressed air
had been previously invented. ... Other apparatus closely
approximating that of the patent in suit had been used for
transporting grout. In his specifications McMichael's only
suggestion as to why they were unfit for concrete is that the pipes
and parts were not of sufficient size. But obviously a mere change
in proportion would involve no more than mechanical skill and
would not amount to invention.
431
The Court drew a parallel with Concrete Appliances, paraphrasing the
Court's holding in that case as also lacking any new application or
principle and, therefore, within "the mechanical skill of those familiar
with engineering and building problems":
This court [in Concrete Appliances] called attention to the fact
that the principle of conveying and distributing a mobile substance
by gravity had been exemplified in various methods for centuries,
and that long prior to the patent there in suit the principle had been
applied to various substances such as grain, coal, crushed stone,
sand, and iron ore, and said ....
"The observations of common experience in the mechanical arts
would lead one to expect that once the feasibility of using 'wet'
concrete in building operations was established, the mechanical
skill of those familiar with engineering and building problems
would seek to make use of known methods and appliances for the
convenient handling of this new building material.
As in Concrete Appliances and Powers-Kennedy, the Court in
Saranac Automatic Machine Corp. v. Wirebounds Patents Co.
appeared, at least, to link new application of principle, or a lack of it,
to "mechanical skill" in assessing patentability.4 33 First, "conception"
of the patented invention by Inwood and Lavenberg was found by the
Court to have been disclosed in the prior art:
The conception of Inwood and Lavenberg which was new, was
that the pre-formed cleats and side materials could be assembled
and so positioned with reference to each other, that they could be
431. Id. at 184-85.
432. Id. at 186-87 (quoting Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 184
(1925)).
433. Saranac Automatic Mach. Corp. v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S. 704, 712-13
(1931).
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stapled together to manufacture, in the single stapling operation,
the finished product, the box blank ready for folding....
This conception is that of the reissue (product) patent, held valid
as a basic patent in Wirebounds Patents Co. v. Chicago Mill &
Lumber Co., and by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Wirebounds Patents Co. v. Gibbons Box Co....
Thus this patent completely discloses the invention of Inwood
and Lavenburg and the advance which it made over the prior art.
434
Then, differences in the Inwood and Lavenburg patent from the prior
art were held by the Court to be "not invention, but the application of
mechanical skill to the solution of the problem of devising suitable
mechanical means for the manufacture of foldable box blanks by the
process or method disclosed by the reissue patent. ' '435 The Court
characterized the solution to the problem of "devising suitable
mechanical means" as obvious, "[b]ut the solution of that problem
was, we think, obvious, involving only the adaptation of familiar
mechanical means for holding cleats and sides in place and requiring
no more than the mechanical skill of the calling.
' 436
In Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 
437
the Supreme Court again linked "mere exercise of the skill of the
calling, 438 with lack of any application of new principle. In this case,
the patentees employed a flywheel in a device "for securing
uniformity of speed in machines used for recording and reproducing
talking motion pictures. '439 Several prior instances were cited by the
Court, beginning with Edison in 1879, where patentability was denied
for use of a flywheel "for the purpose for securing uniformity of
motion" of a phonograph cylinder. 440 The Court in Altoona held that
the claimed invention involved "no new principle, to produce an old
result, greater uniformity of motion," and was, therefore, merely the
"product of skill, not of invention":
An improvement to an apparatus or a method, to be patentable,
must be the result of invention, and not the mere exercise of the
skill of the calling or an advance plainly indicated by the prior
art.... The patentees brought together old elements, in a
434. Id. at 709-10 (citation omitted).
435. Id. at 711.
436. Id.
437. Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477 (1935).
438. Id. at 486.
439. Id. at 479.
440. Id. at 484.
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mechanism involving no new principle, to produce an old result,
greater uniformity of motion. However skillfully this was done,
and even though there was produced a machine of greater precision
and a higher degree of motion-constancy, and hence one more
useful in the art, it was still the product of skill, not of invention.
441
Decided between 1925 and 1935, Concrete Appliances (1925),
Powers Kennedy (1931), Saranac (1931) and Altoona (1935) all
determined the presence of invention by assessing whether anything
more than mere mechanical skill was applied, and in all three cases
the assessment followed identification of the presence or lack of any
new application of principle by the claimed invention in the solution
of a problem. In Saranac, the word "obvious" is used twice with
reference to distinctions of the claimed invention over the prior art. 442
In all four cases, lack of any new application of principle was the
basis for subsequently concluding that no more than "ordinary
mechanical skill" was required to supply the differences between
prior art and a claimed invention.
D. The Ghost is Born
In Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 443 the
Supreme Court held that the combination of a known automatic
thermostatic control of an electric heating unit with a manually
operated "wireless" or "cordless" lighter to obtain an automatic
wireless lighter was not inventive because it was not the product of
"inventive genius." The Court reasoned:
Mead's device was not patentable. We cannot conclude that his
skill in making this contribution reached the level of inventive
genius which the Constitution (Art. I, § 8) authorizes Congress to
reward. He merely incorporated the well-known thermostat into
441. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
442. Saranac Automatic Mach. Corp. v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S. 704, 711, 713
(1931). The second instance of the word "obvious" in Saranac states:
The pushers and hold back, like the channels and space blocks of the work
holder, are familiar mechanical means for holding materials in position while
work is being done upon them. Given the method of the reissue patent, failure to
adapt these obvious means to the solution of the problem at hand would, we
think, have evidenced a want of ordinary mechanical skill and familiarity with
them.
Id. at 713.
443. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
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the old "wireless" lihter to produce a more efficient, useful, and
convenient article.
Further, the Court asserted that Hotchkiss established "ingenuity"
beyond that of a "mechanic skilled in the art" as a threshold condition
for patent protection because "Since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood ... it
has been recognized that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged
position of a patent more ingenuity must be involved than the work of
a mechanic skilled in the art. 445
The Cuno Court relied on six cases for crediting Hotchkiss with
establishing this threshold requirement. 446 In the first of those cases,
Hicks v. Kelsey,447 the Court recited only the portion of Hotchkiss
which "held that the substitution of porcelain for metal in making
door-knobs of a particular construction was not patentable, though the
new material was better adapted to the purpose and made a better and
cheaper knob-having been used for door-knobs, however, before., 4
48
In Slawson v. Grand St. R.R. Co.,449 the Court referenced Hotchkiss
only in its conclusion that the addition of a second glass pane to a
fare-box "would not be [an] invention within the meaning of the
patent law., 450 In Morris v. McMillin,451 the Court referenced
Hotchkiss as an illustration of a case where combining known
components "did not require invention. 4 52 In Phillips v. Detroit,453
the Court employed Hotchkiss to illustrate "only the use of ordinary
judgment and mechanical skill. '' 4  The Court does not mention
Hotchkiss at all in Saranac Automatic Machine Corp. v. Winebounds
Patents Co. 455 or Honolulu Oil Co. v. Halliburton.456 None of these
444. Id. at 91 (emphasis added). The language of the majority in Cuno stated, at least in
dicta, that "the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius,
not merely the skill of the calling." Id. This has since been explained by the Supreme Court as
being merely "rhetorical embellishment of language going back to 1833." Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (1965).
445. Cuno, 314 U.S. at 90 (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248, 265
(1851)).
446. Id. at 90-91.
447. Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 670 (1874).
448. Id. at 674.
449. Slawson v. Grand St. R.R. Co., 107 U.S. 649 (1883).
450. Id. at 653.
451. Morris v. McMillin, 112 U.S. 244 (1884).
452. Id. at 249.
453. Phillips v. Detroit, Ill U.S. 604 (1884).
454. Id. at 607.
455. Saranac Automatic Machine Corp. v. Winebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S. 704 (1931).
456. Honolulu Oil Co. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550 (1939).
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cases asserted that the Court in Hotchkiss inaugurated any new
doctrine.
The next major Supreme Court decision on inventive merit,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co.,45 7 makes no
mention of Cuno or Hotchkiss.458 The patent was directed to a leak-
proof dry cell for a flashlight battery.459 The Court upheld the district
court's finding of validity of the patent and asserted the inadequacy of
retrospective assessments of obviousness, holding that "[v]iewed after
the event, the means Anthony adopted seem simple and such as
should have been obvious to those who worked in the field, but this is
not enough to negative invention. '46° Even Justice Black who, in
dissent, argued that "[t]hose who strive to produce and distribute
goods in a system of free competitive enterprise should not be
handicapped by patents based on a 'shadow of a shade of an idea,
'461
did not invoke Cuno. Nor did he rely on Hotchkiss for the premise
attributed to it by the Court in Cuno: that invention requires more than
the "work of a mechanic skilled in the art.,
4 62
Lower courts were loath to adopt the dicta of Cuno regarding
"inventive genius" and, even as early as 1944, were providing
explanations of that case that were closely in accord with prior
jurisprudence. For example, in In re Shortell,463 the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals declined to apply any distinct "flash of genius"
test that would be "a higher standard of invention than had been for
many years required. ' '464 Rather, the court expressly construed the
term "flash of creative genius" as being "intended to mean nothing
more than that the thing patented must involve more than the skill of
the art to which it relates. 465 Of more significance, however, is the
court's suggestion that a standard of non-obviousness was in
existence for "more than a hundred years." In other words, from a
time prior to Hotchkiss:
The Supreme Court, for more than a hundred years, held... that
when patentable subject matter is properly applied for and claimed,
it is patentable if the thing claimed was not anticipated, was not
457. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275 (1944).
458. Id.
459. Id. at 276.
460. Id. at 279.
461. Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting At. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883)).
462. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp, 314 U.S. 84, 90 (194 1).
463. In re Shortell, 142 F.2d 292 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
464. Id. at 295.
465. Id.
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obvious to one skilled in the art, and the other conditions named in
section 4886 of the Revised Statutes are met.
46 6
Even more interesting is that, although the court in Shortell did recite
and quote from Hotchkiss, it did so along with a partial quotation
from McClain v. Ortmayer,467 which stated that "whether the
variation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than
ordinary mechanical skill is a question which cannot be answered by
applying the test of any general definition. '468 Hotchkiss is not
credited with the genesis of any doctrine.
In Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc. v. Interchemical Corp.,469 the
Supreme Court also did not apparently attribute Hotchkiss the
significance given it by the court in Cuno. Hotchkiss was not cited in
the "long line of cases," among which Cuno was listed in Sinclair,
where it was held "to be an essential requirement for the validity of a
patent that the subject-matter display 'invention,' [and] 'more
ingenuity... than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art."' 47 0 The
patent at issue in Sinclair was directed to a printing ink which dried
instantly upon heating.47' The Court invalidated the patent in view of
prior patents that "taught an ink made with a solvent that would be
non-volatile at room temperature and highly volatile when heated,
' 472
effectively holding that the claimed subject matter lacked any new
application of principle. The Court, however, couched the holding in
what had become the conventional language of "invention":
Even assuming that if Gessler had discovered the compound he
would be entitled to a patent, he did not discover it. Reading a list
and selecting a known compound to meet known requirements is
no more ingenious than selecting the last piece to put into the last
opening in a jig-saw puzzle. It is not invention.473
In Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 4 74 the Court explicitly
relied on the lack of any new application of principle to invalidate a
patent which employed centrifugal force to direct molten wax into a
primary mold, . and employed the broad language of "invention,"
466. Id. (citation omitted).
467. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1981).
468. Shortell, 142 F.2d at 295 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891)).
469. Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
470. Id. at 330.
471. Id. at 328.
472. Id. at 334.
473. Id. at 335.
474. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
475. The Court stated:
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or in this case, "inventive genius." Specifically, the Court relied upon
Cuno for support, stating:
Where centrifugal force was common as a means of introducing
molten metal into the secondary mould, its use in an intermediate
step to force molten wax into the primary mould was not an
exemplification of inventive genius such as is necessary to render
the patent valid. The patentee himself admitted that the same
principle was employed in both steps.
476
The majority opinion went so far as to quote deposition testimony of
the patentee: "Q. But they both operate in the same way under the
influence of the centrifugal machine? A. The same principle is used,
yes." 47 7
V. REPLACEMENT OF "INVENTION" WITH "PATENTABILITY"
The last decision by the Supreme Court to address "the correct
criteria of invention" prior to the Patent Act of 1952 was Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.,4 78 which
issued on December 4, 1950. Judge Rich recalled this date as being
particularly significant because the Supreme Court opinion influenced
him and the Congressional committee on which he served "to replace
the case law with a statutory provision":
Now, it is very significant that what persuaded the Coordinating
Committee to replace the case law with a statutory provision was
the Supreme Court's opinion, and Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion, published in the New York Times on the very day in 1950
that the Committee was having a meeting, in the case of The Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp. I am
sure that it is because I remember reading the opinions aloud that
day to the Drafting Committee. The decision may have been all
right, but we considered what was said in the opinions to be typical
of all that was wrong with the patent law's "invention"
requirement.
479
An examination of the prior art as it existed at the time of this alleged invention reveals that
every step in the Jungersen method was anticipated. We think that this combination of these
steps was, in its essential features, also well known in the art.
Jungersen's process is nothing more than a refinement of a method known as the "cire perdue"
or "lost wax" process, which was in use as early as the sixteenth century.
Id. at 563-64.
476. Id. at 566 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
477. Id. at 566 n.6.
478. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 148 (1950).
479. See Rich, supra note 31, at 168-69 (citations omitted).
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In A&P, the Court examined a patent which entailed
a cashier's counter equipped with a three-sided frame, or rack, with
no top or bottom, which, when pushed or pulled, will move
groceries deposited within it by a customer to the checking clerk
and leave them there when it is pushed back to repeat the
operation. It is kept on the counter by guides.
480
The lower court's decision upholding the validity of the patent was
reversed. 48' However, as Judge Rich made clear in his recollection of
the committee's decision, it was not the decision of the Court which
troubled the committee, but rather the Court's opinion.482 Specifically,
the committee found that the Court's reasoning lacked any
meaningful indicia for assessing the patentability of a combination of
old elements:
The problem the Court posed for itself was this:
"What indicia of invention should the courts seek in a case
where nothing tangible is new, and invention, if it exists at all,
is only in bringing old elements together?"
The Court's first big step towards solving its problem was to
say:
"It is agreed that the key to patentability of a mechanical
device that brings old factors into cooperation is the presence
or lack of invention."
483
According to Rich, the Court's lack of proper reasoning in coming to
the conclusion that the claimed invention was not patentable
"clinched the decision" by the committee to impose a statutory
requirement that "would serve as a uniform standard of patentability":
The only defect which the Supreme Court could find in the
concurring validity findings of the lower courts was
"that a standard of invention appears to have been used that is
less exacting than that required where a combination is made
480. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 149.
481. Id. at 154.
482. Judge Rich wrote:
I hope you note that I distinguish between decisions and opinions .... Many a
sound decision is rationalized by atrocious reasoning in the opinion, often written
by someone who does not know what he is talking about or what his words may
be doing to the law. And that is where most of our trouble comes from today.
See Rich, supra note 31, at 169.
483. Id. (quoting Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 150-5 1).
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up of old components. It is on this ground (the court said) that
the judgment below is reversed."
That reasoning is what clinched the decision to enact a statutory
substitute that would make more sense, would apply to all kinds of
inventions, would restrict the courts in their arbitrary, a priori
judgments on patentability, and that, above all, would serve as a
uniform standard of patentability. And so we come to 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.484
Judge Rich stressed in his recollection of the coordinating
committee's decision that the new statute they proposed was to be a
substitute for case law, at least as it was embodied by the reasoning of
the Court in A&P:
[M]y position is that Congress, enacting the Patent Act of 1952,
did replace the A&P Case reasoning-not its decision on the facts-
by substituting statutory for case law.
As compared to finding or not finding "invention," Section 103
was a whole new way of thinking and a clear directive to the
Courts to think that way. Some courts and some lawyers do not yet
seem to realize that.
485
Far from viewing section 103 as a "whole new way of thinking,"
even the first lower court cases understood the new statutory
requirement to have "done no more in this respect than to adopt the
test of so-called 'obviousness' which has, in the past, been enunciated
by the courts, and that it did not provide a new test differing from that
which has been generally followed in the adjudication of the patent
cases. ' 486 Even more striking, in view of Judge Rich's later comments
regarding A&P as motivation for proposing the new statutory
requirement, the court for the 6th Circuit in General Motors Corp. v.
Estate Stove Co. held that "the principle stated in the Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. case is not modified by the new Act, but continues to
be the law, and is here controlling. 48 7
Closer inspection of the circumstances surrounding the new
statutory requirement of non-obviousness, however, reveals that what
should be considered the strangest reaction is Judge Rich's surprise
that interpretation of section 103 had become, by the time of his
acceptance speech at the Kettering Award in 1964, in his words, a
484. Id. at 169-70 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154).
485. Id.
486. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir. 1953)
487. Id. at 918.
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"mish-mash. '4 88 Judge Rich argued much later, in 1972, that section
103 was not simply a codification of judicially-created patent law, but
also a revision that inserted a threshold requirement beyond
"invention" and, as a consequence, some prior case law, including the
dictum in Cuno, had been overruled:
[Section 103] was a new statement of an old requirement of the
law which was utterly uncertain and indefinite. The statute
undertook to remove ambiguity and provide definiteness.
On the point of Section 103 being "codification" it is interesting
to consider the last sentence of the section which says
"Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made." The specific intent of that sentence, which
courts universally accepted without question, was to overrule the
Cuno case dictum that a "flash of genius" was necessary. One
cannot call that "codification."
As I sometimes remind attorneys arguing cases, "There is
always an invention. What we are considering is its
patentability. "
489
If the standard of "patentability" was, by the language of section 103,
to be determined against what "would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains, '49° and if, as indicated in the
House and Senate reports, this standard was "a condition which exists
in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason
of decisions of the courts, 491 then the statutory test for patentability
was only new in that it became a uniform requirement as a
consequence of its being dictated by statute. Therefore, section 103
may be deemed a revision only because it overruled inconsistent
judicial precedent. In a sense, whether section 103 was characterized
as "codification" was immaterial. As stated by Judge Rich:
The [House and Senate] reports also say that "the section is added
to the statute for uniformity and definiteness." Such statements and
others made it arguable that it was just a "codification." But what
does that mean? What is a codification? Do you follow the statute
or ignore it? If you ignore it, why have it?
488. See Rich, supra note 3 1, at 158.
489. See Rich, supra note 47, at 172-73.
490. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
491. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 7 (1952); S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952).
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Codification is a loose term. It has been defined as the
collection, condensation, systematizing and reconciling of what is
scattered or contradictory. Yes, Title 35 as a whole is a
codification; but it is also specifically and officially described as a
codification and revision.
4 92
The difficulty in applying the statutory requirement of non-
obviousness in view of "ordinary skill in the art" as a "codification
and revision" of judicial precedent is that the terminology of
"ordinary skill" or its equivalent had been used for more than one
hundred years, as cited by the House and Senate Reports, but rarely in
a vacuum. Hotchkiss, in fact, said little more than that there must be
application of more than ordinary skill. Furthermore, it did so only in
the limited context of invalidating a patent that substituted one "form"
of material having well-known properties for another. However, lack
of patentability for a mere change of form was a well-established
doctrine by the time of Hotchkiss, one that Jefferson professed to
apply under the Patent Act of 1790.493 Therefore, reliance on
Hotchkiss as a seminal case underlying the new statute, as was
suggested by Judge Rich and by the "Revision Notes," 494
understandably left courts looking for additional guidance on how to
measure "patentability."
Contrary to the suggestion in the legislative history of section
103, the opinion in Hotchkiss was not groundbreaking. As we have
seen, an "improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the
process of any composition of matter, 4 95 as a requirement beyond
utility and bare novelty, first appeared formally in the Patent Act of
1793 and was explicitly applied by courts thereafter. Justice Story, in
particular, systematically looked for new application of principle as a
criterion in determining the validity of patents. He distinguished
between the skill of a "mere artisan" as evidence of enablement of a
specification, and that of persons "thoroughly conversant with the
subject of mechanics as a science., 496 For Justice Story, this
492. See Rich, supra note 47, at 171.
493. See Jefferson, supra note 7, at 335. As stated by Jefferson:
As a member of the patent board for several years, while the law authorized a
board to grant or refuse patents, I saw with what slow progress a system of
general rules could be matured. Some, however, were established by that board..
.Another rule was that a change of material should not give title to a patent....
A third was that a mere change of form should give no right to a patent ....
Id.
494. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 18 (1952); S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 18 (1952).
495. Patent Act of 1793, ch. I1, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1848).
496. Allen v. Blunt, I F. Cas. 448,450 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
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distinction could be relied upon to "answer the question whether or
not a particular machine was substantially in its mode of operation
[i.e., application of principle] new, or identical with another, although
with apparent differences of form and structure, which might mislead
the unscientific mind., 497 Both were important to Justice Story as
"classes of witnesses," but had "different purposes. 498
The Court in Hotchkiss did not overrule any of the previous
decisions made relating to patentability, but instead simply failed to
fully articulate judicial precedent, thereby confusing the matter for
anyone attempting to rely on Hotchkiss. There was no general
recognition of new precedential value in Hotchkiss until legislation of
the Patent Act of 1952 following Cuno. Nevertheless, once begun, the
Supreme Court as well as lower courts increasingly made decisions in
view of Hotchkiss and on that basis. Further, since the Court in
Hotchkiss said little more than that patentability required more than
the skill of the "ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business," it is
not surprising that courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, would
attempt to further develop the doctrine of "non-obviousness." In fact,
the Revision Notes attached to the House and Senate reports
discussed above state that the new statutory provision of non-
obviousness was "added with the view that an explicit statement in
the statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a
basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be
worked out."4 99
Judge Learned Hand reflects this expectation of further criteria
in his short recitation of the development of section 103 in Lyon v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 500:
From 1793, when the second patent act was passed, until the
Act of 1952, the only statutory standard for invention was that the
discovery should be "new and useful"; and indeed the Act of 1952
itself repeats the same test in § 101. Congress did not try to define
it but left it to the courts to develop by precedent. So far as we can
find, it was not until 1850 that the Supreme Court made any such
attempt; so that, although the disclosure must be "new," it was so,
provided it had not been published or in public use and was
original..... Even Cuno Engineering Corp., v. Automated
Devices Corporation... recognized the continued authority of
497. Id.
498. Id. ("It appears to me, that the patent acts look to both classes of persons, not only as
competent, but as peculiarly appropriate witnesses, but for different purposes.").
499. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 18; S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 18 (emphasis added).
500. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Hotchkiss v. Greenwood... "if an improvement is to obtain the
privileged position of a patent more ingenuity must be involved
than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art." . . . "The principle
of the Hotchkiss case applies to the adaptation or combination of
old or well known devices for new uses."
We assume that the usual presumption against retroactivity
would have applied to § 103, had the purpose not been so explicit
to make the Act retroactive .... This interpretation is, moreover,
confirmed by the report of the House as to § 103 .... Therefore,
we can see no escape from accepting the text as it reads, except as
"at a later time * * * some criteria * * * may be worked out. ' ,5° I
The idea of continued authority of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood expressed
by Judge Hand was also supported by a "Study of the Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the
Judiciary" of the United States Senate, published in 1958, which
specifically stated that two early bills50 2 regarding "novelty," "utility,"
and "routine skill" tests were
an attempt to incorporate into the code the rule of Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood to the effect that in order to find patentable invention
something more than the skill and ingenuity possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business must be
present.
503
In 1960, Judge Hand, again addressed the history and policy
behind enactment of section 103:
We still cannot escape the conclusion-as we could not when Lyon
v. Bausch & Lomb... was decided in 1955-that Congress
deliberately meant to restore the old definition, and to raise it from
a judicial gloss to statutory command. It is not for us to decide
what "discoveries" shall "promote the progress of science and
useful arts" sufficiently to grant any "exclusive right" of
inventors .... Nor may we approach the interpretation of § 103 of
the Title 35 with a predetermined bias.
504
501. Id. at 534-35 (2d Cir. 1955) (citation omitted) (quoting Cuno Eng'g. Corp. v.
Automated Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1941)).
502. S. 2518, 81st Cong. (1952); H.R. 6436, 81st Cong. (1952).
503. STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF
INVENTION 9 (Comm. Print 1958) (citation omitted) [hereinafter STATUTORY STANDARD].
504. Reiner v. 1. Leon Co., Inc., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).
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Judge Hand acknowledged the "misty" nature of the statutory test
under section 103, but pointed to some sign posts evidencing more
than "ordinary skill" in the "art":
The test laid down is indeed misty enough. It directs us to surmise
what was the range of ingenuity of a person "having ordinary skill"
in an "art" with which we are totally unfamiliar .... To judge on
our own that this or that assemblage of old factors was, or was not,
"obvious" is to substitute our ignorance for the acquaintance with
the subject of those who were familiar with it. There are indeed
some sign posts: e.g., how long did the need exist; how many tried
to find the way; how long did the surrounding and accessory arts
disclose the means; how immediately was the invention recognized
as an answer by those who used the new variant?
50 5
Complexity was clearly excluded by Judge Hand as a criterion. Judge
Hand stated that "[u]nless we are to measure invention by the size and
complexity of the product, this new article fulfilled the qualifications
for a patent.,'
50 6
The first Supreme Court cases directly addressing section 103
were decided in 1966. In Graham v. John Deere Co.,50 7 Justice Clark
reiterated statutory patentability under the Patent Act of 1952 as a
codification "embracing the principle long ago announced by this
Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood":
We have concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to codify
judicial precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by
this Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, and that, while the clear
language of § 103 places emphasis on an inquiry into obviousness,
the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability
remains the same.
508
The Court, however, like Judge Rich in the lectures he gave,
recognized the "difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test," and
asserted a "belief," fourteen years after enactment of the statutory
requirement, that "uniformity and definiteness" would result:
What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be
uniformity .... The difficulties, however, are comparable to those
encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as
negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case
development. We believe that strict observance of the requirements
505. Id. at 503-04.
506. Id. at 504.
507. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
508. Id. at 3-4 (citation omitted).
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laid down here will result in that uniformity and definiteness which
Congress called for in the 1952 Act.
50 9
The three cases joined under Graham included two separate
patents, one to a spring clamp for a chisel plow, U.S. 2,627,798 (the
'798 patent), 510 and the other, U.S. 2,870,943 (the '943 patent), which
was directed to a "plastic finger sprayer with a single 'hold-down' lid
used as a built-in dispenser for containers or bottles packaging liquid
products." 51' The claimed spring clamp of the '798 patent was
distinguished from the prior art by "interchanging of the shank and
hinge plate and the consequences flowing from this arrangement."
51 2
The Court summarized that the patented arrangement "permits the
shank to flex under stress for its entire length,"5 13 which, according to
the patentees, "effectively absorbs the tremendous forces of the shock
of obstructions whereas prior art arrangements failed."5 14 With respect
to the sprayer cases, 5 5 the only distinction identified by the Court was
a "rib and shoulder seal" of the claimed device in place of a "tongue
and groove technique" in the prior art.5 16 The prior art technique was
considered by the Court to be "inherently a more stable structure,
forming an interlock that withstands distortion of the overcap when
subjected to rough handling. 5 17
In holding the patent claims at issue in all three cases to be
invalid,5 18  the Court considered whether they represented
improvements in performance. Specifically, with respect to the
claimed plow clamp, the Court referred to testimony alleging that the
advantages associated with improved flexing were not significant:
Moreover, the clear testimony of the petitioner's expert shows that
the flexing advantages flowing from the '798 patent arrangement
are not, in fact, a significant feature in the patent.
509. Id. at 18.
510. Id. at 19-20.
511. Id. at 26.
512. ld. at23.
513. Id.
514. Id. at24.
515. Id. at 26 n.14. The '943 patent was assigned to Cook Chem. Co. Baxter 1. Scoggin
was the inventor of the '943 patent. In the second case, Calmar was the manufacturer of the
infringing device (Case. No. 37), and Colgate was a customer of Calmar and user of the device
(Case No. 43).
516. Id. at 31.
517. Id. at 31-32.
518. Id. at37.
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"Q. Do you think that it is a substantial factor, a factor of
importance in the functioning of the structure? A. Not a great
factor, no." 
519
The Court also referred to art that was not before the Examiner, and
wherein, according to the Court, "the mechanical operation is
identical," and distinguished "operative mechanical distinctions" from
"nonobvious differences":
We find no nonobvious facets in the '798 arrangement. The wear
and repair claims were sufficient to overcome the patent
examiner's original conclusions as to the validity of the patent.
However, some of the prior art, notably Glencoe, was not before
him. There the hinge plate is below the shank but, as the courts
below found, all of the elements in the '798 patent are present in
the Glencoe structure. Furthermore, even though the position of the
shank and hinge plate appears reversed in Glencoe, the mechanical
operation is identical .... The mere shifting of the wear point to
the heel of the '798 hinge plate from the stirrup of Glencoe-itself a
part of the hinge plate-presents no operative mechanical
distinctions, much less nonobvious differences. 520
Similarly, with respect to the '943 patent of the Cook Chemical
cases, the Court referenced reliance by the inventor, Scoggin, during
prosecution of the patent application, "entirely upon the sealing
arrangement as the exclusive patentable difference" over the prior art
considered by the Examiner, which did not include a patent to
Livingstone. 521 The Court found Scoggin's rib to be "fully disclosed
and dedicated to the public," by virtue of the Livingstone patent.
522
Despite the fact that the '943 patent was directed to a liquid container
having a pump sprayer rather than a pouring spout as taught by
Livingstone, the Court found that both devices solved "mechanical
closure problems" and, therefore, were part of the same art:
Cook Chemical argues, however, that Livingston is not in the
pertinent prior art because it relates to liquid containers having
pouring spots rather than pump sprayers.... The problems
confronting Scoggin and the insecticide industry were...
mechanical closure problems. Closure devices in such a closely
related art as pouring spouts for liquid containers are at the very
least pertinent references.
523
519. Id. at 25 & n.13.
520. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
521. Id. at 32, 35.
522. Id. at 35.
523. Id.
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As with the clamp for the chisel plow, the Court found that the
difference between Scoggin's claimed invention and the prior art
"rests upon succeedingly small and quite non-technical mechanical
differences. 524
In effect, the Court found that both the claimed clamp and pump
sprayer lacked patentability because there were no "operative" or
"mechanical" differences between the claimed devices and the
relevant prior art. Specifically, the claimed clamp did not meet the
minimum threshold condition of "nonobviousness" because the Court
found "no operative mechanical distinctions, much less nonobvious
differences. 525 Similarly, the Court characterized the novelty of the
claimed pump sprayer as "non-technical mechanical differences," and
only then made reference to what "would have been obvious to a
person reasonably skilled in that art." 526 Failure to find "operative" or
"mechanical" distinction appears remarkably like the language of
"mode of operation" and "new application of principle" employed in
cases dating from the early English cases. These cases, including
Boulton v. Bull5 27 formed the basis for early nineteenth century
holdings of patentability in the United States, well before Hotchkiss.
528The companion case to Graham, United States v. Adams,
which was decided on the same day, upheld the validity U.S. Patent
2,322,210, directed to a water-activated constant potential battery
having a magnesium electropositive electrode (anode) and a fused
cuprous chloride electronegative electrode (cathode).52 9 The battery
was useful because it could be stored for long periods of time without
deterioration, and was activated by simply adding either plain or salt
water as an electrolyte. 530 The battery had a large capacity for
generating current and exhibited a constant voltage regardless of
current.53t Further, the battery was "operable from 65 degrees below
zero Fahrenheit to 200 degrees Fahrenheit.532 The Government
entered into several contracts with companies to produce the battery
524. Id. at 36.
525. Id. at 26.
526. Id. at 36-37.
527. See supra 121-153 and accompanying text.
528. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
529. Id. at 42-43.
530. Id. at 42.
531. Id. at43.
532. Id.
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during World War II despite initial reports suggesting serious doubts
of the inventor's claims to the battery's performance capability.'
The inventor, Adams, sued the Government after his request for
compensation was denied in 1960, five years after he had learned that
the Government not only changed its opinion of the utility of the
battery, but made extensive use of it, as well.5 34 In its defense, the
Government argued that Adams' patent was invalid for lack of
novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and obvious under 35 U.S.C. §
103 . Regarding lack of novelty, no single reference was identified
that included all of the elements of Adam's claimed battery. Instead,
the Government based its argument, in part, on equivalence of prior
art batteries with component parts of Adam's claimed battery.
According to the Government, despite "the fact that, wholly
unexpectedly, the battery showed certain valuable operating
advantages over other batteries [these advantages] would certainly not
justify a patent on the essentially old formula., 536 Several references
cited by the Government were either inoperable or failed to
identically disclose Adams' claimed combination of a magnesium
anode and a cuprous chloride cathode.537 The Court identified
teachings absent from each of the references, including lack of
"indication" or "suggestion" of substitutions in component parts of
the prior art battery cells that would be necessary to obtain Adams'
claimed invention. For example, the Court rejected combination of a
patent to Wood with a treatise by Niaudet in part for lack of an
"indication of its use with cuprous chloride" or "any indication that a
magnesium battery could be water-activated., 538 The Court also
533. Id. at 44.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 48.
536. Id. The Court further stated that the Government's position "concludes that wet
batteries comprising a zinc anode and silver chloride cathode are old in the art; and that the prior
art shows that magnesium may be substituted for zinc and cuprous chloride for silver chloride."
Id.
537. See id. at 45-48. One reference, Skrivanoff, taught a magnesium electrode and a
cathode "faced with" a paste that included cuprous chloride. The Court found that there was no
evidence that the cathode "as placed in the battery" would actually contain cuprous chloride.
Moreover, an attempt at assembling the battery taught by Skrivanoff resulted in fire and an
explosion, and so was inoperable. Id. at 47-48.
538. id. at 47. The Court stated the following:
The Niaudet treatise describes the Marie Davy cell invented in 1860 and De
La Rue's variations on it. The battery comprises a zinc anode and a silver
chloride cathode....
The Wood patent is relied upon by the Government as teaching the
substitution of magnesium, as in the Adams patent, for zinc. . . . There is no
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rejected combination of these references with a treatise by Codd
because "[h]e does not teach that magnesium could be combined in a
water-activated battery .... Nor does he suggest, as the Government
indicates, that cuprous chloride could be substituted for [the] silver
chloride [cathode taught by Niaudet]. '5 39 Instead, according to the
Court, Codd "merely refers to the cuprous ion-a generic term which
includes an infinite number of compounds-and in no way suggests
that cuprous chloride could be employed in a battery."5 40 The Court
also found that the component substitutions necessary in each of the
references were not "merely equivalent substitutions" in view of the
fact that Adams' battery, as "the Government apparently admits...
'wholly unexpectedly' has shown 'certain valuable operating
advantages over other batteries' while those from which it is claimed
to have been copied were long ago discarded., 54' In other words, the
Court's equivalency analysis relied on unexpectedly improved
performance as evidence that Adams' claimed battery operated by
virtue of an application of principle not found in any of the relevant
prior art. The claimed battery, therefore, in the eyes of the Court, was
novel, at least in part, because it lacked an equivalent in the prior art:
We believe the Court of Claims was correct in concluding that
the Adams battery is novel.... An inoperable invention or one
which fails to achieve its intended result does not negative
novelty....
Nor is the Government's contention that the electrodes of
Adams were mere substitutions of pre-existing battery designs
supported b5y the art.... For these reasons we find no
equivalency.
The Court's conclusion of non-obviousness was considered separately
from novelty:
We conclude the Adams' battery was also non-obvious. As we
have seen, the operating characteristics of the Adams battery have
been shown to have been unexpected and to have far surpassed
then-existing wet batteries.... This is not to say that one who
merely finds new uses for old inventions by shutting his eyes to
their prior disadvantages thereby discovers a patentable innovation.
indication of its use with cuprous chloride, nor was there any indication that a
magnesium battery could be water-activated.
Id. at 45-46.
539. Id. at 47.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 51.
542. Id. at 50-51.
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We do say, however, that known disadvantages of old devices
which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions
may be taken into account in determining obviousness.
Nor are these the only factors bearing on the question of
obviousness. We have seen that at the time Adams perfected his
invention noted experts expressed disbelief in it. Several of the
same experts subsequently recognized the significance of the
Adams invention, some even patenting improvements on the same
system. 543
The factors considered by the Court in Adams, as relevant to
non-obviousness, were also those associated with evidence of
unexpected results relied upon by the Court in its novelty analysis.
The Court concluded that Adams' battery was not equivalent to those
in the prior art. Therefore, just as with the claimed plow clamp and
pump sprayer of Graham, the Court in Adams could have come to the
same conclusion regarding the patentability of Adams' battery
without separately addressing "non-obviousness."
Anderson 's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc.,
544
continued the theme of first searching for a new application of
principle, if any, and then determining, as a separate issue,
patentability under the non-obviousness standard of section 103 as a
conclusory assessment founded on the result of that search.545 At issue
was the validity of a patent, U.S. 3,055,280, directed to an apparatus
that included, with a conventional bituminous paver, a radiant heat
burner that would prepare the edge of a previously laid cold strip of
pavement in order to prevent the formation of what was known as a
"cold joint" between sequentially laid strips of "black top. '5 46 Use of
radiant heat burners to lay asphalt pavement was previously known,
as was the use of radiant heat burners to patch limited areas of
asphalt. 547 The patentee's placement of a radiant heat burner on an
otherwise known device for laying strips of asphalt was not
considered by the Court to produce a "'new or different function,'...
within the test of validity of combination patents. 548 The Court relied
on Graham for the standard of patentability to be applied to a
543. Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added).
544. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
545. Id.
546. Id. at 57.
547. Id. at 58-59.
548. Id. at 60 (quoting Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Wamer Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549
(1938)).
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combination of known elements.549 Specifically, the Court quoted
Graham for its test of obviousness, reciting the steps of determining
the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior
art and claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art.550 The Court then came to separate conclusions that the claimed
apparatus "added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat
burner already patented," and that "the use of the old elements in
combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious
standard":
We conclude that while the combination of old elements
performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and
quality of the radiant-heat bumer already patented. We conclude
further that to those skilled in the art the use of the old elements in
combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious
standard.
551
Therefore, as in Graham and Adams, the Court assessed novelty in
application of principle, and then followed up closely thereafter with
a distinct conclusion regarding obviousness under section 103.
In like manner, the Court concluded that a claimed "machine
system for automatic record keeping of bank checks and deposits,"
was unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in Dann v.
Johnston.552 There, the Court held that, although the claimed system
was not "equivalent" to a prior art "automatic data processing
system... for use in a large business organization," it was "closely
analogous," whereby "each shares a similar capacity to provide
breakdowns within its 'Item Groups' or category numbers., 553 The
Court concluded that "[w]hile the [prior art] invention is not designed
specifically for application to the banking industry many of its
characteristics and capabilities are similar to those of respondent's
system. 554 Following the analysis of the Court in Graham, Adams
and Anderson's Black Rock, the Court in Dann clearly partitioned
equivalence in component parts from determinations of obviousness
under section 103:
549. Id. at 61-62 ("In this case the question of patentability of the combination turns on the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which the Court reviewed in the Graham case.").
550. Id. at 62.
551. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
552. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220, 229 (1976).
553. Id. at 228-29.
554. Id.
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[R]respondent's invention does something other than "provide a
customer with ... a summary sheet consisting of net totals of
plural separate accounts which a customer may have at a bank."
However, it must be remembered that the "obviousness" test of §
103 is not one which turns on whether an invention is equivalent to
some element in the prior art but rather whether the difference
between the prior art and the subject matter in question "is a
difference sufficient to render the claimed subject matter
unobvious to one skilled in the applicable art.
555
Nevertheless, by drawing an analogy with a patented system directed
to departments at business organizations, the Court found an avenue
that rendered meaningless the differences between the claimed
inventions. As in the previous Supreme Court cases applying the
statutory requirement of non-obviousness, the conclusion of non-
obviousness followed directly from the Court's apparent exclusion of
principle as a distinction from the prior art:
Respondent makes much of his system's ability to allow "a large
number of small users to get the benefit of large-scale electronic
computer equipment and still continue to use their individual
ledger format and bookkeeping methods." It may be that that
ability is not possessed to the same extent either by existing
machine systems in the banking industry or by the Dirks system.
But the mere existence of differences between the prior art and an
invention does not establish the invention's nonobviousness. The
gap between the prior art and respondent's system is simply not so
great as to render the system nonobvious to one reasonably skilled
in the art.
556
The last Supreme Court decision prior to KSR International Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc.557 that directly addressed patentability under the non-
obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103 was Sakraida v. Ag Pro,
Inc. 558 The patent at issue in Sakraida claimed a system for removing
cow manure from the floor of a dairy barn.559 Use of water, delivered
from tanks or pools to barn floors by means of high pressure hoses or
pipes, was known. 560 The Court phrased the only point of novelty as a
"provision for abrupt release of the water from the tanks or pools
directly onto the barn floor, which causes the flow of a sheet of water
555. Id. at 228 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
556. Id. at 229-230 (emphasis added).
557. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
558. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
559. Id. at 273-74.
560. Id. at 276-77.
2009] STATUTORY NON-OBVIOUSNESS AS NOVELTY 631
that washes all animal waste into drains within minutes and requires
no supplemental hand labor." 561 The Court, however, held that this
was nothing more than extension of the previously applied principle
of gravity and, therefore, "would be obvious to any one skilled in the
art of mechanical application":
Exploitation of the principle of gravity adds nothing to the sum of
useful knowledge where there is no change in respective functions
of the elements of the combination; this particular use of the
assembly of old elements would be obvious to any one skilled in
the art of mechanical application.
562
Therefore, once again, even after statutory recognition of Hotchkiss as
providing a threshold requirement of patentability distinct from novel
application of principle, the Court's conclusion of obviousness
followed the Court's inability to identify any such new application.
VI. KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. v. TELEFLEX, INC. AND "COMMON
SENSE"
A. A "Common Sense" Approach
Most recently, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent directed to
an adjustable foot pedal assembly for use in automobiles. The Court,
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., reversed a decision by the
Federal Circuit, in Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International, Co.,563 which
held that the district court, in turn, "erred as a matter of law by
applying an incomplete teaching-suggestion-motivation test to its
obviousness determination. 5 64 The Federal Circuit, in reversing the
district court, recited teachings of several references relied upon
during prosecution of the '565 patent, and an additional reference,
U.S. 5,010,782, issued to Asano, et al., which was not cited or relied
upon during prosecution of the '565 patent at the United States Patent
and Trademark Office. The Federal Circuit stated that the "district
court was required to make specific findings as to whether there was a
suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings of Asano with an
electronic control in the particular manner claimed by claim 4 of the
'565 patent" and "was required to make specific findings as to a
suggestion or motivation to attach an electronic control to the support
561. Id. at 277.
562. Id. at 282.
563. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l, Co., 119 F. App'x. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007).
564. Id. at 290.
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bracket of the Asano patent assembly. '565 The Federal Circuit
concluded that application of the "teaching-suggestion-motivation
test" by the district court was incomplete because it failed to make
any "findings as to the specific understanding or principle within the
knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no
knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the manner
claimed. 566
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit's summary
of the District Court decision, that "Asano taught everything
contained in claim 4 except the use of a sensor to detect the pedal's
position and transmit it to the computer controlling the throttle," and
that "[t]hat additional aspect was revealed in sources, such as the '068
patent and the sensors used by Chevrolet." 567 Further, the Court
summarized the Federal Circuit decision as being based on a finding
that "District Court had not been strict enough in applying the
[teaching-suggestion-motivation] test" and that the "District Court
was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be solved satisfied this
requirement because unless the 'prior art references addressed the
precise problem that the patentee was trying to solve,' the problem
would not motivate an inventor to look at those references. 568 The
Supreme Court also noted that the Federal Circuit found irrelevant
that "it might have been obvious to try the combination of Asano and
a sensor ... because 'obvious to try' has long been held not to
constitute obviousness.
'
"
569
The Court began its own analysis by quoting the policy of the
Court in A&P of proscribing unwarranted diminishment of "resources
available to skillful men":
Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham
disturbed this Court's earlier instructions concerning the need for
caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements
found in the prior art. For over half a century, the Court has held
that a "patent for a combination which only unites old elements
with no change in their respective functions... obviously
withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly
and diminishes the resources available to skillful men." This is a
565. Id. at 288.
566. Id. (quoting In reKotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
567. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1738.
568. Id. (quoting Teleflex, 119 F. App'x at 288).
569. Id. at 1739 (quoting Teleflex, 119 F. App'x at 289).
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principle reason for declining to allow patents for what is
obvious.
5 70
The Court then summarized Adams, Anderson's-Blackrock, and
Sakraida as illustrating the doctrine that "combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it
does no more than yield predictable results., 571 Also, although "the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [in In re Berge] captured a
helpful insight"572 in establishing a requirement of a "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements, in order to
show that the combination is obvious," the Court noted that,
nevertheless, "it can be important to identify a reason that would have
prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine
the elements in the way the claimed new invention does., 573 The
Supreme Court clearly relied upon identifying motivation in the art to
combine known elements, and upon its belief that the motivation
might take several different forms:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the
design community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill
in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by
the patent at issue .... As our precedents make clear, however, the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific
subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account
of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would employ.
574
For example, "a known problem for which there was an obvious
solution encompassed by the patent's claims" was provided by the
Court as an example of "[o]ne of the ways in which a patent's subject
matter can be proved obvious., 575 Further, the Court generalized the
source of motivation to "any need or problem known in the field of
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent.
5 76
Even more fundamentally, the Court grounded obviousness of a
570. Id. (quoting Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,
152-53 (1950)).
571. Id.
572. Id. at 1741 (referencing In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961)).
573. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
574. Id. at 1740-41.
575. Id. at 1742.
576. Id.
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combination of known elements on common sense by stating that
"[c]ommon sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have
obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a
person of ordinary skill would be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle. 577 The Court invoked
"common sense" a second time as a measure of statutory obviousness,
particularly with respect to requisite motivation in combining known
elements to solve a problem:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
under § 103.578
The Federal Circuit's strict adherence to an explicit finding of a
teaching, suggestion or motivation in the prior art to combine
elements was held by the Court to be a misunderstanding of earlier
precedent that provided for "recourse to common sense., 579
As applied to the facts of the case, the Court stated that the issue
was "[w]hether a pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide
range of needs created by developments in the field of endeavor,
would have seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor., 580 The
Court answered in the affirmative, namely, that "designers might have
decided to design new pedals from scratch; but they also would have
had reason to make pre-existing pedals work with the new
engines. 581 Presuming then, that a designer would start with Asano,
the Court queried "whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill starting
with Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on a fixed
pivot point." 582 Then, noting the "wire chaffing problems of Rixon
and Smith's teaching [in the prior art] that 'the pedal assemblies must
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id. The Court stated that "[r]igid preventative rules that deny fact finders recourse to
common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it. ...
[T]he fundamental misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to
apply a test inconsistent with our patent law decisions." Id. at 1742-43.
580. Id. at 1744.
581. Id.
582. Id.
2009] STATUTORY NON-OBVIOUSNESS AS NOVELTY 635
not precipitate any motion in the connecting wires,' '5 83 the Court
concluded that "the designer would know to place the sensor on a
nonmoving part of the pedal structure," and that the "most obvious
nonmoving point on the structure from which a sensor can easily
detect the pedal's position is a pivot point." 584 From this, and a lack of
"secondary factors," the Court held that the subject matter of claim 4
failed to meet the requirement of section 103:
Teleflex has shown no secondary factors to dislodge the
determination that claim 4 is obvious. Proper application of
Graham and our other precedents to these facts therefore leads to
the conclusion that claim 4 encompassed obvious subject matter.
As a result, the claim fails to meet the requirement of § 103.585
The opinion of the Court concluded with the now familiar-
sounding refrain that "results of ordinary innovation are not the
subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws" and asserted that
Hotchkiss established "the bar on patents claiming obvious subject
matter" on the premise that "[w]ere it otherwise patents might stifle,
rather than promote, the progress of useful arts," contrary to the stated
intent of the Constitution:
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable
reality around us new works based on instinct, simple logic,
ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even
genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, define
a new threshold from which innovation starts once more. And as
progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is expected
in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the
subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful
arts. These premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious
subject matter established in Hotchkiss and codified in § 103.
Application of the bar must not be confined within a test or
formulation too constrained to serve its purpose.586
B. Common Sense as Applied to Patentability
Title 35 of United States Code limits patents to any "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
583. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,063,811 col.1 1.36-37 (filed June 9, 1990)).
584. Id. at 1744-45.
585. Id. at 1745.
586. Id. at 1746 (citation omitted).
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useful improvement thereof."587 Casting the source of motivation so
broadly as to include an "apparent reason to combine the known
elements"5 88 to address a "problem known in the field of endeavor at
the time of invention ' '589 as outlined at least in dicta by the Supreme
Court in KSR, is to provide a basis for finding any beneficial
combination of known components obvious. The fundamental
distinctions between obvious and non-obvious subject matter, as
articulated by the Court, are "real innovation" 590 and "common
sense," which are inherently rhetorical terms that provide little
practical guidance.
Motivation was not a consideration of the Court in Hotchkiss.
During their supporting argument, the patentees actually presumed
that the claimed invention entailed a combination that one skilled in
the art would be motivated to make:
Knobs had been in use many hundred years; potter's ware and
porcelain, many thousands; but no one ever before succeeded in
uniting the clay and the iron so as to make of the two a substantial
and useful article. There are many difficulties in uniting them,
which can be best explained by a careful examination of the new
591manufacture itself ....
Instead, consideration of skill beyond that of the ordinary mechanic
hinged on the relationship between a substituted or added component
and the remainder of the patented subject matter. The Court
considered mere substitution of "materials better adapted to the
purpose" to be a legally inadequate basis for patent protection.592
As discussed above, the Court has employed parallel language
concluding that there were (1) "no operative mechanical distinctions"
587. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) The full text of section 101 reads: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."
588. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
589. Id. at 1742.
590. Id. at 1741 ("Granting patent protection to advances that occur in the ordinary course
without real innovation retards progress and may in the case of patents combining previously
known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.").
591. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248, 254 (1850) (emphasis added).
592. Id. at 266. The Court stated:
But this, of itself, can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a
machine, made, in whole in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for
which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for
that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one; or, in the
sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.
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in Graham;593 (2) systems that were "closely analogous," having
"characteristics and capabilities [that] are similar... [although] not
possessed to the same extent" in Dann;594 (3) no "new or different
function[s]" in Andersons Black-Rock;595 and (4) "no change in the
respective functions of the elements of the [claimed] combination" in
Sakraida.596 In all four cases, the Court was looking for novelty in the
form of a new application of principle as reflected by the functional
relationship between novel combinations of components. In other
words, simple substitution of one component for another that was
known, or addition of another part that merely extends a principle of
operation, did not reflect any new application of principle. This
resulted even if the alteration yielded an improvement in the results,
particularly as occurred in Anderson's Black Rock and Sakraida. The
Court in Adams, on the other hand, in concluding that there were no
"equivalent substitutions" or "equivalent operating characteristics ' 97
in the prior art references, found a new application of principle in that
none of the operative principles in any of the prior art references
could account for the performance of Adams' battery. Motivation in
the art to build a dry battery having superior performance
characteristics, then, far from providing a basis for declaring Adam's
claimed battery to be obvious, supported the conclusion by the Court
that it was not.
Hotchkiss was not the first Supreme Court decision to mandate
more than a novel combination of component parts. Early in the
nineteenth century, Justice Marshall, in Evans v. Eaton598 approved of
Oliver Evans' new application of principles as his basis for patentable
distinction, where "[h]e asserts himself to be the inventor of the
machines and claims the application of these principles, to the
improvement of the process of manufacturing flour, and other
purposes, as his invention and improvement in the art., 599 Prior to
Evans, Justices Washington and Story, at the circuit court level,
593. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 26 (1996).
594. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1976).
595. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (quoting
Lincoln Eng'g. Co. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938)).
596. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
597. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51 (1966).
598. See supra notes 170-176 and accompanying text.
599. 16 U.S. (Wheat. 3) 454, 515 (1818). Agreeing with Mr. Evans, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that "[i]t is, then, the opinion of this court, that Oliver Evans may claim, under his patent,
the exclusive use of his inventions and improvements in the art of manufacturing flour and meal,
and in the several machines which he has invented, and in his improvements on machines
previously discovered." Id. at 517 (Marshall, C.J., concurring).
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likewise distinguished mere changes in form or proportion from
patentable distinction.600 Even Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Isaac
McPherson referencing Oliver Evans' improved Hopper-boy,
distinguished principle from form: "But it is the principle, to wit, a
string of buckets, which constitutes the invention, not the form of the
buckets, round, square, or hexagon; nor the manner of attaching them,
nor the material of the connecting band, whether chain, rope, or
leather. ' 6
0 1
The idea that patentability lay in a new application of principle
was founded in the Patent Act of 1793.602 Development of this idea in
the United States borrowed heavily from jurisprudence of the English
courts, such as Boulton v. Bull, 60 3 dating from the 1790's and
continuing into the early nineteenth century. The distinction between
a new application of principle, which could be embodied in a
combination of parts, each known in the art, as patentable subject
matter, and its absence, represented, for example, by novel changes
only in form or proportion, which was not patentable, was well-
developed by the time Hotchkiss was decided. Further, reference by
the Court in Hotchkiss to ordinary skill was not new, having been the
fundamental premise for denying patentability for mere changes in
form or proportion as early as Thomas Jefferson's tenure as Secretary
of State under the Patent Act of 1790.604 The Court in Hotchkiss also
did not change the fundamental requirements of patentability; the
Supreme Court relied on new application of principle for patentable
distinction well into the twentieth century, albeit sporadically at
times. Even more convincing is that, although Hotchkiss was
occasionally cited among many other Supreme Court cases in
subsequent decisions, broad acceptance of Hotchkiss as being the first
case to establish "that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged
600. For an opinion by Justice Washington, see Park v. Little, 18 F. Cas. 1107, 1108
(C.C.Pa. 1813) (No. 10,715) ("Is it an improvement in the principle or in the form? If the
former, then it is no invasion of the plaintiffs privilege-if the latter, it is."). For an opinion by
Justice Story, see Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.Mass. 1813) (No. 17,971) ("A
mere change of former proportions will not entitle a party to a patent. If he claim a patent for a
whole machine ... it must be a new mode, method, or application of mechanism, to produce
some new effect, or to produce an old effect in a new way.").
601. Jefferson, supra note 7, at 329.
602. Patent Act of 1793, ch.ll, § 2, 1 Stat. 318-23 (1793) (repealed 1836) ("Provided
always, and be it further enacted, that any person, who shall have discovered an improvement in
the principle of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have
been patented .... ").
603. Boulton v. Bull, 2 H.B. 463, 463 (1795).
604. Jefferson, supra note 7, at 335.
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position of a patent more ingenuity must be involved than the work of
a mechanic skilled in the art," only occurred after the Supreme Court
decision of Cuno, ninety years later.60 5 And even after Hotchkiss was
firmly established as a watershed decision, Supreme Court decisions
since the Patent Act of 1952, until KSR, arguably looked to new
application of principle, as contrasted with differences in form only,
as a conclusion penultimate to holdings regarding obviousness under
section 103.
In KSR, the Court did not need to rely on motivation, regardless
of its source, or notions of "real innovation," "common sense," or
even "ordinary skill." Under the facts of KSR, it was enough that the
only element not taught by Asano was the use of a sensor.60 6 As noted
above, neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court disagreed
with the district court's assessment of the prior art, despite the fact
that both embodiments of Asano et al. appear to be much more
complicated than that of the '565 patent.
An even more basic question of patentability therefore could
have been whether substitution of electronic control (i.e., a sensor) for
a cable presented any operative mechanical distinctions., 60 7 Evidence
that this substitution is, in the words of the Supreme Court in Adams,
an "equivalent substitution" 60 8 can be found in the specification of the
'565 patent, which provides for use of a cable attachment member in
place of electronic throttle control 28:
A cable attachment member can optionally be supported on one of
the [fixed] pivot members to support a cable assembly for
attachment to the engine throttle. This configuration would be used
in place of the electronic throttle control 28; i.e., the configuration
is used with a pedal assembly having a mechanical link to the
throttle.
60 9
In short, the specification of the '565 patent supports replacement of a
cable linked to a fixed pivot as taught by Asano et al., with an
605. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90 (1941).
606. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. 1738, 1743 (2007).
607. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 26.
608. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 50. As stated by the Adams Court:
Nor is the Government's contention that the electrodes of Adams were mere
substitutions of pre-existing battery designs supported by the prior art. If the use
of magnesium for zinc and cuprous chloride for silver chloride were merely
equivalent substitutions, it would follow that the resulting device-Adams'-would
have equivalent operating characteristics. But it does not.
Id. at 50-51.
609. U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 col.4 1.62-67 (filed Aug. 22, 2000) (claim numbers
omitted).
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electronic throttle control attached to a support of a pedal assembly,
as in claim 4 of the '565 patent. To quote the Court in Sakraida, this
substitution is an "[e]xploitation of... principle... [that] adds
nothing to the sum of useful knowledge where there is no change in
the respective functions of the elements of the [claimed]
combination. ,610 Just as reversal of the shank and hinge plate in
Graham resulted in mechanical operation identical to the prior art
reference by Glencoe, so, also, substitution of a cable linkage to a
fixed pivot with an electronic throttle control to a support, presented
"no operative mechanical distinctions., 61 ' The subject matter of claim
4 of the '565 patent embodied no new application of principle as that
standard has existed since the Patent Act of 1793, and in accordance
with the "common sense and common life" as expressed by Justice
Story.
612
VII.ELIMINATING THE "MYTHICAL MAN"
On November 30, 1949, two months before P.J. Federico's draft
"Proposed Revision and Amendment of the Patent Laws," of which
Section 23, after revision, became Section 103 of the Patent Act of
1952, was "widely circulated,, 61 3 a trio of papers was presented
before the New York Patent Law Association, 6 14 one entitled
"Standards of Invention in Mechanical Cases," by Conder C.
Henry,615  and another entitled, "The Concept of Patentable
Invention," by P.J. Federico.616 In his paper, Federico acknowledged
that "Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, is usually cited as the first case" to
apply "the concept of invention as we use it today., 617 Amazingly,
however, he asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Hotchkiss
was based on novelty:
One quotation from the decision is significant. The court said:
No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part,
of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used
610. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
611. Graham, 383 U.S. at 26.
612. See text at note 203.
613. See STATUTORY STANDARD, supra note 503, at 9
614. All three papers appear in Forum of The New York Patent Law Association on the
Subject of 'Patentable Invention,' 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 89 (1950).
615. See Henry, supra note 11.
616. See P.J. Federico, The Concept of Patentable Invention, 32 J. PAT. & OFF. SOC'Y 118
(1950). For the third paper presented, but not discussed here, see Daniel H. Kane, Patentable
Invention and Our Political Economy, 32 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 89 (1950).
617. Id. at 121. The paper is a summary of Mr. Federico's presentation.
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than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for
that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the
old one; or, in the sense of the patent, can entitle the
manufacturer to a patent.
This places the matter on the basis of novelty, the new machine
cannot be distinguished from the old one, hence is the same, is not
novel. The court goes on to say:
The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or
invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the
selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of
the instrument for the purpose intended, but nothing more.
This phrase introduces the concept of lack of invention as we
use it today.
618
Federico also surmised that, even before Hotchkiss, not every
novel combination was deemed patentable:
What was done before the decision of the Supreme Court? It is
inconceivable that patents were granted and sustained for
everything different, but not very much information is
available.... In the case of combinations of old elements, the
combination might simply be held not new in the absence of any
new cooperative relationship, and similarly with the substitution of
known devices or materials.
Despite the lack of information, it is believed that the realization
that a patent could not be granted or sustained for every change
must have come early. We find Thomas Jefferson writing in 1814
of such things as unpatentable combinations, substitution of
material, and new uses of old machines.
619
Federico concludes with a "fundamental axiom that something new
and different cannot be patented merely because it is new and
different, and without regard to the quantum of novelty. 62 °
Conder C. Henry, a former Assistant Commissioner of Patents,
used machines as a model for explaining patentability in his paper. He
began by outlining the "distinctive characteristics of a machine" as
having "at least some moving parts and the parts must move relative
to each other with definite motions," or "an internal rule of operation
of its own."621 He contrasted these alternative characteristics from
aggregations which "designate mechanisms consisting of an
618. Id.
619. Id. at 122.
620. Id.
621. Henry, supra note 11, at 101.
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assemblage of mechanical elements which do not cooperate to
produce any unitary result., 622 Henry noted that improvements on old
or "exhausted" combinations "must involve some new mechanical
principle or mode of action in the machine itself."623 At a time
antecedent to any statutory recognition of "non-obviousness" as a
prerequisite to patentability, Henry articulated two classes of
anticipation: "(1) Where the references disclose exactly the same parts
associated and functioning in the same way to produce the same
operative result as the invention it is desired to anticipate, and (2)
Where such art differs from the claimed invention in structure, or in
function, or in result."
624
The first class is now commonly understood to be novelty. The
second class appears to be Henry's understanding of a type of novelty
which he describes as lacking when "the public has knowledge of the
invention as evidenced by a single reference on the ground that the
differences are immaterial and obvious., 625 In one instance of the
second class, described by Henry as the "most usual situation ... one
reference is modified in view of others." 626 According to Henry, a
finding of anticipation under the second class is unwarranted "[i]f
after making the substitution the parts of the resulting mechanism
interact differently from the parts of the principle reference,
regardless of the result," or, alternatively, "[w]here it is necessary to
modify materially the substituted element to adapt it for
substitution."
627
A difference that is "material and unobvious," according to
Henry, occurs when the result is a "new mechanical structure, or
causes the machine to function in a new way, or to produce a new or
improved result., 628 In the case of either substitution or modification,
Henry's test is "not whether equivalency exists but whether
something else exists," and the questions are "of invention and not of
anticipation. ' '629 However, Henry recognized the problem of
gainsaying obviousness conclusively or after the fact: "All too
frequently the grants of patents are refused and patents are held
invalid on this ground without sufficient explanation or justification.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 102.
624. Id. at 104.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 106.
627. See Henry, supra note 11, at 106.
628. Id. at 104.
629. Id. at 107.
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To rule capriciously that claimed differences are obvious is to
pronounce judgment without inquiry as to the facts. 630 In effect, he
questioned estimations of the ability of the "average engineer," and
proposed an alternative:
Would it be easier by its adoption and less expensive in a disputed
case to prove, for example, that the average engineer solely from
the knowledge of mechanics existing at the time could not have
designed a particular machine, than to prove that such machine
differs from prior art mechanisms by its internal rule of operation?
I do not think so.
63 1
Henry proposed a bill "designed to eliminate the mythical man
endowed with the speculative skill of the art" 63 2 The Bill would have
amended Section 4886 of the Revised Statutes 633 by adding the
following sentence:
Without prejudice to any other patentability determining factor,
invention shall be found present in a mechanical combination
whenever any new functional relationship or mode of operation
shall be found to exist between any of the elements or parts of such
combination required for rendering it practically operative to
produce a new or improved and useful result.
634
Although the proposed additional language is limited to a
"mechanical combination," the phrases "new functional relationship"
and "mode of operation," have been applied synonymously with "new
application of principle," and in many different contexts beyond
interaction between component parts of machines.
There is no mention in the Study of the Subcommittee of Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights published in 1958 of Henry or of
substituting for "subjective" determinations of the abilities of the
"common man skilled in the art." However, his presentation is at least
circumstantial evidence that, as late as 1949, "principle" or "mode of
operation" was at least anecdotally related to notions of patentability,
which could be assessed independently of, and even as an alternative
to, assessments of "ordinary skill in the art," in determining the
patentability of claimed subject matter.
630. Id. at 105.
631. Id. at 117.
632. Id. at 118.
633. The pertinent part of section 4886 the Revised Statutes stated that "[a]ny person who
has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, may obtain a patent therefor." 18 Stat. 953,
954 (1875).
634. Henry, supra note 11, at 118.
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CONCLUSION
Exclusivity as an award for merit has always required more than
simple novelty of any component or combination of parts. However,
measurement of the merit required to obtain the award of exclusive
rights has been founded upon contribution to the public domain and
upon the idea that not all novel subject matter constitutes
contribution, even though it may be useful. Contribution has been
associated with ingenuity since establishment of the Venetian system
of exclusionary grant. Language of the United States Patent Acts of
1790 and 1793 drew from both the English and French systems.
Furthermore, early case law in the United States frequently cited
English cases, all of which agreed that a contribution sufficient to
merit grant of exclusionary rights was a reflection of something more
than bare novelty. Invention generally was gauged by the presence of
a new application of principle or new "mode of operation," and could
be embodied by a new operative combination among known
component parts.
The Supreme Court in Hotchkiss did not supplant the framework
of patentability relied upon under existing or earlier patent acts, nor
did it apply an additional condition for patentability not previously
conceived. Rather, the Court, consistent with the maxim that
patentability did not consist of mere changes in form or proportion,
reflected Justice Story's distinction between an ordinary artisan's
testimony as evidence of enablement, and that of a "person trained in
the science to which it belonged" as a test of patentability. 635
Evidence that Hotchkiss was not a watershed decision can be found in
the many of the following cases that continued to maintain that a new
application of principle or new mode of operation constituted
patentable distinction over prior art.
The Court in Cuno asserted otherwise. It was at this time that
President Roosevelt appointed the National Patent Planning
Commission which concluded in 1948 that "[o]ne of the greatest
technical weaknesses of the patent system ... is the lack of a
definitive yard stick as to what is invention., 636 The assertion by the
Court in Cuno, that Hotchkiss established the requirement that "if an
improvement is to obtain the privilege[d] position of a patent more
ingenuity must be involved than the work of a mechanic skilled in the
art,,637 likely would not have been a premise for establishing the
635. Allen v. Blunt, 1 F. Cas. 448, 450 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 216).
636. See STATUTORY STANDARD, supra note 503, at 2.
637. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90 (1941).
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National Patent Planning Commission. On the other hand, the Court's
statement, in dicta, that a "new device, however useful it may be,
must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the
calling," 638 probably contributed to the general impression that the
standard for "invention" was vague. Regardless, efforts subsequent to
the National Patent Planning Commission's report, which issued in
1943,639 appear to be based on a presumption that the Court in Cuno
was correct with respect to the precedential significance of Hotchkiss
and were directed to crafting statutory language that would make the
construed understanding of Hotchkiss more explicit in the hope of
making its application consistent and, thus, more predictable.
Judge Rich's subsequent speeches lamenting the "mish-mash
' 640
that ensued after enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 strongly
suggests, even by the admission of one of its strongest proponents,
that § 103, by denying patentability to "subject matter [that] as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains," 641 was not having the desired effect. Even the Supreme
Court in Graham, despite expressing belief that uniformity would
result from the guidelines laid down in that case, conceded that
determinations of obviousness were subject to lack of "uniformity of
thought., 642 If motivation is to be a consideration under a "common
sense" standard, as propounded by the Court in KSR, then, arguably,
any statutory subject matter under section 101 that contributes to the
public domain can be found to be obvious since, almost by definition,
there would be motivation in the art to effect the result of any new
and useful combination of known elements.
The Supreme Court has, for the most part, invoked a requirement
of a new application of principle, or new mode of operation, under the
various Patent Acts since the Patent Act of 1793. Even under the
Patent Act of 1790, Thomas Jefferson required some new application
of principle apart from a mere change in form or proportion.. The
presence of a new application of principle in patented subject matter
has often been expressed as a feature or contribution beyond the
capability of one of "ordinary skill." Although ingenuity has always
638. Id. at 91.
639. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. 78-230, at 6,
10(1943).
640. Rich, supra note 31, at 158.
641. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
642. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
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been affiliated with patent protection, it has never been the test, as
evidenced by the many opinions which clearly express that the
manner in which an invention is obtained, whether by insight,
experimentation or accident, is immaterial. The plain meaning of the
last sentence of section 103(a), that "[p]atentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made, ' '643 is
consistent with earlier patent statutes and Supreme Court decisions
addressing "invention." This meaning provides for patentability
regardless of the capabilities of the inventor in fact or in theory;
patentability of claimed subject matter is an intrinsic feature
possessed relative to the prior art existent at the time of conception
and reduction to practice.
The presence of motivation in the art cuts as easily in favor of
patentability as a secondary consideration under the dicta in Graham
as it cuts against patentability as applied by the Supreme Court in
KSR. In other words, consideration of motivating factors expands the
subjective analysis to the quality of input that resulted in the claimed
contribution and does not address or recognize the properties of that
contribution, which may not reflect at all the manner in which it was
produced. The fact that, under section 103, the manner in which an
invention is made is immaterial, combined with general recognition of
section 103 as a codification of judicial precedent, strongly suggests
that the statutory test of non-obviousness continues to be the presence
of a new application of principle embodied in a new functional
relationship among component parts, albeit expressed from the view
point of one of ordinary skill in the art.
Although put in the context of machines, Conder Henry had a
point that could broadly be applied to all technologies and to all
patentable subject matter. Henry's address in 1949 rings as true after
KSR as it did just prior to the 1952 Patent Act:
Hasn't the time arrived when we should sponsor the adoption of a
positive method of proving an invention in machines by avoiding
the necessity of establishing subjectively and often by sheer guess
work what the common man skilled in the art can or cannot do?
And wouldn't that method be to proceed directly to the proof of
whether the patented machine in controversy has or has not a new
functional relationship between its parts to produce a new
result?
64 4
Common sense.
643. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
644. Henry, supra note 11, at 117.
